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Much has been said and written in recent years about the short-
comings of the voter. Many diagnoses of his condition have been 
offered, and not a few remedies proposed. But there has been little 
exact investigation of the questions at issue, such as would indicate 
their specific character and extent, or the nature and comparative 
influence of the underlying factors y such, therefore, as would pro-
vide a basis for a realistic, "practical" attack on this most important 
group of problems. T h e present monograph reports the findings 
of a quantitative study designed to throw some further light on this 
situation. 
The results of any such study are necessarily presented in sta-
tistical form. Most of the discussion will be intelligible to readers 
not familiar with statistical methods. Examination by readers of 
this class has been facilitated by putting the more technical matter 
in footnotes, and including simple expositions of this material in 
the main text. Those interested in this feature, however, will find 
technical terms and formulae explained at convenient points, mostly 
in footnotes. 
The persons who assisted in the study are too numerous to 
mention by name. They were mostly students and colleagues at 
the University of Kansas and various other institutions. The in-
vestigation would scarcely have been feasible without their co-
operation. Mention should be made, however, of certain specific 
contributions to the undertaking. Grants authorized by the Gradu-
ate Research Committee of the University of Kansas provided 
necessary financial assistance. Drs. Stuart A, Queen and Carroll D . 
Clark, respectively a former and the present Chairman of the De-
partment of Sociology in the same institution, have cooperated in 
various ways. The Committee on Humanistic Studies, especially 
Professors R. D . O'Leary, F . H . Hodder and F. H . Guild, have 
offered many valuable suggestions and criticisms. The study is 
indebted, above all, to Professor E. B. Dade, of the University of 
Kansas, who has given much time to consultations on technical 
problems; and to officers of the Standard Life Association for gen-
erously permitting the use of sorting and counting machines, with-
out which the detailed classification of so much data might not have 
been possible. Special thanks are due Mr. Francis Baty, of the As-
sociation, who contributed a great many hours of work to the me-
chanical tabulation of the data. His was, indeed, an invaluable 
service. The charts were prepared by Mr. William A. Edson, a 
student at the University of Kansas. 
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PUBLIC I N T E L L I G E N C E 
A Study o f t h e Att i tudes and Opinions 
o f Voters 
I 
N A T U R E O F T H E STUDY 
During the years 1924 to 1927, inclusive, data regarding 1250 
voters were gathered with the assistance of students at the Univer-
sity of Kansas, and a number of persons connected with other in-
stitutions. These data and statistical analyses thereof are here pre-
sented. A questionnaire was used in the collection of data. By its 
means a "true-false" test of political opinions was administered, 
and information on the voter's age, sex, occupation, schooling, po-
litical affiliation, legal residence, and other characteristics was ob-
tained. This questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix A. 
Scores of "political intelligence" were computed on the basis of 
the true-false test. This was not presented to the voter as a true-
false test, but as a list of statements about which opinions differed. 
T h e scores thus obtained have been classified and compared accord-
ing to age, sex, occupation, schooling and other categories in which 
voters may be distributed. In addition, the partisan affiliations of 
the voters have been compared with those of their fathers, and 
percentages of identity in this matter computed and analyzed for 
a like series of categories. 
Of the 1250 voters, 960 were legal residents of Kansas, and 
the remaining 290 were distributed among nineteen other States, 
120 of them in Missouri. Nine hundred and fifty-three of the vot-
ers were males; 297, females. A selection of voters adequately rep-
resentative of the country as a whole was not feasible because of 
the procedure employed in gathering the data. The attempt was 
made to obtain complete information on all questions, and this en-
tailed solicitation of voters 5 co-operation in personal interviews, 
checking for omissions by field workers (mostly student assistants) 
before interviews were terminated, and in many instances subse-
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quent inquiries to cover questions omitted despite these precau-
tions. A great majority of the voters were selected on the basis of 
accessibility to the student assistants. Most of them, however, re-
sided in the home communities of the assistants, or other conven-
ient localities. 
But efforts were made to minimize the non-representative 
character of the selection. A number of social science teachers in 
States other than Kansas were asked to have questionnaires filled 
out by voters convenient for them or for their students to reach. 
Their cooperation yielded many of the usable returns from those 
States. These provide some check on the representative character 
of the voters concentrated in Kansas. In addition, pains were taken 
to restrict selection of Lawrence voters to a minimum. 
In two respects, however, the non-representative character of 
the selection was deliberately accentuated. Owing to special inter-
est on the part of persons cooperating in the study, a considerable 
number of teachers were asked to fill out questionnaires ; and, be-
cause of the longer experience of men as voters, field workers were 
instructed to have a major portion of questionnaires filled out by 
men. 
While the selection is not a representative one for the country 
as a whole, its non-representative character may easily be overesti-
mated. The several classifications in which voters have been dis-
tributed, in the tabulation and analysis of data, may perhaps be 
taken as indicating fairly representative samples for the various 
age, sex, occupational and other categories. Most conspicuously 
non-representative is the residential concentration of voters .5 but 
even here a check is afforded by the voters outside this area of con-
centration. As will appear, this check indicates that, as regards 
"political intelligence", the selection as a whole may not be far 
from representative. 
Most of the significant information on the age, schooling, read-
ing habits and other characteristics of voters may be conveniently 
presented in the discussion of these as political influences. The oc-
cupational complexion of the selection has exceptional significance, 
however, and should perhaps be described at the outset. 
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The item of the questionnaire on this point reads thus: "Prin-
cipal occupation for past five years." The question is, of course, 
framed in terms too general to permit a classification of reported 
occupations according to specific vocational interests. This and cer-
tain other questions were constructed in general terms so as not to 
discourage voters, most of whom have no experience in such mat-
ters, by confronting them with an elaborate document such as a 
more detailed questionnaire might have seemed. Moreover, a de-
tailed classification of occupations would have been of little value 
in view of the comparatively small number of voters covered by 
the investigation. But in many instances the answers to this ques-
tion did not permit of classifications that were deemed important, 
namely, the assignment of voters to what may be termed vocational 
classes. Consequently, field workers were instructed to check an-
swers with that purpose in view and to ask voters, where necessary, 
for information of classificatory value. The classification provided 
for seven main categories, as follows: 
(1) Farmers, including all engaged in agriculture or stock-
raising, whether as tenants or land-owners. 
(2) Manual Workers (often designated, hereafter, as "man-
uals") , including all engaged in manual occupations for wages. It 
is probable that a few are included in this category who were not 
employed by a business frofrietor} as, for instance, some carpenters. 
Where manual workers could not be confidently assigned to this 
class on the basis of wage employment, they were included in Un-
classified (our seventh main category). 
(3) Non-manual Workers (often referred to as "non-man-
uals") , including all engaged for wages or salaries in "brain work" 
or the so-called "white-collar" occupations, exclusive of professional 
workers. The same explanations apply here as to Manuals, with 
regard to erroneous classifications and inclusion of the unclassifiable 
in Unclassified. 
(4) Business Proprietors. Probably a number of voters be-
longing to this class could not, on the basis of the data, be confi-
dently included in it, and were therefore assigned to Unclassified. 
(5) Professional Workers (conveniently designated as "profes-
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sionals"), including all persons in vocations classifiable under this 
head, irrespective of whether they work on salary for an employer, 
or independently on a fee basis. 
(6) Housewives, including, of course, the wives of men in 
various vocational classes. The category probably includes a small 
number of housekeepers employed for wages. 
(7) Unclassified, which, as the term suggests, is a catch-all 
category for voters who could not be classified under other heads. 
It includes (a) a considerable number for whom sufficient data 
were not obtained to permit of their classification as Manuals, N o n -
manuals, or Business Proprietors, but whose reports indicated t h a t 
they could be classified in one or another of these groups, were 
adequate data available ; (b) a number with two or more occupa-
tions falling in more than one of the first six main vocational 
classes 5 (c) a small number with occupations that could not b e 
subsumed under any of the first six categories ; (d) eleven voters 
whose occupations were not specified; and (e) four voters with n o 
occupation. 
Voters engaged in two or more occupations coming within a 
single vocational class have been included under that class. Those 
reporting themselves "retired" have been assigned to the several 
classes of which they were members when actively occupied. 
Appendix B lists the occupations included in the several classes 
(other than Farmers and Housewives, of which no significant sub -
Table L Distribution of voters by sex and vocational class 
Vocational Class Male Female Total 
Farmers 85 85 
Manual workers 209 6 215 
Non-manual workers 191 18 . 209 
Business proprietors 125 2 127 
Professional workers 220 77 297 
Housewives 141 141 
Unclassified 123 53 176 
Total 953 297 1250 
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divisions were apparent), with the number of voters reporting each 
occupation. Table 1 exhibits the distribution of voters by voca-
tional class and sex. 
I t is, of course, clear from this table that the selection of voters 
as a whole is by no means a representative sample of the entire 
country as regards vocational complexion. Professional workers, 
for example, are greatly over-represented, while farmers and 
"housewives are much under-represented. Similarly, for the reason 
already indicated, the selection is unrepresentative as regards sex 
composition. 
As previously suggested, however, the voters of specific classes 
under these and other general classifications may often be regarded 
as representative samples of those classes. Those, for example, 
in particular occupations (as farmers, or lawyers, the latter a sub-
division of Professionals), or with certain amounts of schooling, 
may be fairly representative for the country at large. One may not 
assert that this is so, but only suggest it, in the absence of evidence 
to the contrary, as not altogether improbable. The unrepresenta-
tive nature of the entire group, and the possibly representative 
character of specific categories, have a bearing on the interpreta-
tion of the data. 
I I 
As previously indicated, study of the voter's "political intel-
ligence" involved the application, in an adapted form, of the meas-
uring device known as the true-false test, developed and utilized 
mainly in testing achievements of pupils in school. A critical ex-
position of the test applied in this study is essential to a correct un-
derstanding of the results. 
The statements of the test pertained only to three general pub-
lic questions—the League of Nations, the tariff, and the compul-
sory arbitration of industrial disputes. It was assumed that state-
ments restricted to a few important questions would supply a fair 
test of political intelligence. All these questions had recently been 
matters of vigorous public discussion, perhaps to a greater extent 
than other questions claiming public attention, with the exception 
of prohibition. The tariff, of course, has been a topic of popular 
though somewhat intermittent discussion for a century, while the 
League of Nations, though of recent origin as a controversial is-
sue, had been a matter of widespread public interest for a number 
of years. The compulsory arbitration of industrial disputes had 
not been so commonly discussed in the country at large, but it was 
a mooted question in the State of Kansas at the time of the study, 
owing to the recent enactment of the so-called Industrial Court 
Law. This act had, indeed, attracted nation-wide attention, and 
the problem was one of more or less popular interest even apart 
from that special circumstance. Questions offering a more signifi-
cant test than these three could not, perhaps, have been chosen. 
The criterion controlling the selection of statements for the 
test is clearly of cardinal importance. It called for and assumed 
the possibility of statements on which the judgments of experts 
would be in agreement. I t therefore excluded statements about 
which experts would differ. Tentative lists of statements were sub-
mitted, for appraisal on this basis, to competent students of the sev-
eral questions involved. The final list included only statements 
MEASUREMENT O F POLITICAL I N T E L L I G E N C E 
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which, according to advice thus obtained, would not be matters of 
controversy among experts. This procedure is open to the possible 
criticism that unanimity of scientific opinion on such matters may 
not be legitimately assumed and in any case could scarcely be de-
termined by consultation with a very small number of experts. 
During the progress of the study itself doubt arose regarding the 
conformity of certain statements to the criterion set up, and these 
were not included in the analysis of the returns. Readers may 
judge for themselves whether the statements that were used (indi-
cated on pp. 9-11) include doubtful ones that may in a measure 
vitiate the results. 
The question may also be raised whether the test is not char-
acterized by a liberal bias on certain of the topics implicated. Such 
a question is not readily answered. Naturally, an effort was made 
to avoid bias of any sort and, on the positive side, to select as tests 
of political intelligence statements whose scientific appraisal was 
beyond dispute. If the selection has been successful in this sense, 
what may appear as liberalist or other bias is sanctioned by scien-
tific opinion. 
A friendly critic has questioned whether some of the state-
ments really concern matters of fact rather than matters of opinion. 
This criticism has been treated, by implication at least, in the ex-
position of the technique of selection and its underlying assump-
tions. Many questions on which popular opinions differ are 
scarcely matters of controversy among experts. Such opinions fig-
ured in the test. Any very significant test of political intelligence 
must of necessity deal with opinions of this order, since they are of 
the very essence of politics, albeit politics is also concerned with 
matters of fact and with questions on which experts differ. Debat-
able opinions in the scientific sense were not involved in the test, 
in so far as the method of selecting statements served its purpose. 
Moreover, certain significant results of the study would scarcely 
be explicable save on the assumption that the test afforded, at least 
as a whole, a reliable index of political intelligence. Amount of 
schooling and number of periodicals read regularly are positively 
correlated with scores yielded by the test. The professional class 
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rates higher, as we should expect, than any other vocational class. 
College teachers, clergymen, and non-college teachers achieved 
higher ratings than other occupational groups, which is also about 
what one would expect. Voters adhering to the same parties as 
their fathers rated lower than voters departing from paternal pref-
erences. While comparative ratings in other instances may occa-
sion surprise, those cited have the value of cumulative evidence, 
indicating as they do, that various groups concerning whose gen-
eral intellectual superiority there would be little question achieved 
superior ratings on this test. 
The scores made on any such test must be interpreted in terms 
of its specific statements and the kinds of information and under-
standing involved in judging those statements correctly. This test 
would not seem to be an unduly difficult one. A few of the original 
statements were excluded from the computation of scores because 
it was concluded, on later consideration, that they presupposed 
more information or greater independence of judgment on public 
questions than could reasonably be expected from a wide variety of 
voters. Correct appraisal of the statements included in the compu-
tations would seem to require no more than the minimum of in-
formation and critical judgment compatible with competent citizen-
ship. Of the twenty statements actually used (see pp. 9-11) it 
would be easy to identify ten that could be correctly evaluated by 
a moderately informed voter, which (with merely chance mark-
ings of the other ten statements) would suffice to classify the voter 
as a competent citizen, according to an assumption later indicated 
(pp. 17-20). I t may be pointed out, moreover, that judging specific 
statements relative to complex questions is easier than judging 
those questions themselves $ easier, too, notwithstanding a common 
opinion to the contrary, than judging candidates for the more im-
portant public offices, since this involves an evaluation not only of 
a candidate's policies on various public questions, but of his fitness 
for the execution of those policies. But the scores of voters covered 
by the study are scores on this test, and one could readily construct 
tests that would give either higher or lower average scores than 
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were yielded by this test. The relative character of the scores 
should be borne in mind. 
Limitations characterizing verbal tests of this sort need not, 
perhaps, be reviewed. These would seem to have been somewhat 
over-stressed in the literature on the subject, in view of the fact 
that social interactions are mediated mainly by verbal communica-
tions and, so far as they become matters of record, are expressed in 
the same medium. Suffice it for our purposes to point out, first, that 
statements of the kind employed in this test are just the sort that 
enjoy general currency in the press and on the platform, that are 
reflected, though indirectly for the most part, in the choices made 
by voters at the polls, and that, therefore, represent vital influences 
on the formation of public policy; and, second, that the technique 
of administering the test was designed to exclude as completely as 
possible all conditions affecting the voter's rating except what he 
thought or felt regarding the statements submitted to him. It is 
altogether probable, as studies by Dr. Read Bain and others would 
indicate, that, had the tests been taken on different dates, the rat-
ings of many individual voters would have been different; but it 
does not follow that the statistical results for the entire group, or 
for its various component classes, would have been substantially 
different. 
For reasons already indicated, only twenty of the thirty state-
ments incorporated in the test were used in the computation of 
scores. For convenience of reference these are reproduced here 
with the correct marking (true or false) given in parenthesis: 
The League of Nations 
W e are taking part in many activities of the League 
of Nations without belonging to it, and therefore shar-
ing to a great extent in its benefits. (True) 
Washington's warning against entangling alliances 
with European nations means that we should not now 
enter the League of Nations. (False) 
Entrance into the League of Nations would be dis-
loyalty to the Constitution, since the Constitution gives 
Congress alone the right to declare war. (False) 
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The distance of the United States from Europe does 
not in itself make it possible for us to keep out of Euro-
pean disputes. (True) 
Giving the League of Nations any control over our 
foreign affairs would be contrary to the principles of self-
government. (False) 
It is our duty to join the League of Nations because 
one of our own Presidents took the lead in establishing 
it. (False) 
Differences in race, language and customs of the vari-
ous countries of the world will make the development of 
an efficient League of Nations difficult. (True) 
The Tariff 
A high tariff is not necessary to the continued pros-
perity of American industry. (True) 
A protective tariff increases the cost of living. (True) 
Tariff laws in the past have been framed to promote 
the welfare of the farmer and wage-earner equally with 
that of the manufacturer. (False) 
It is impossible for Congress to handle tariff questions 
in a way that is just to all concerned. (True) 
High tariffs are one cause of unfriendly feeling be-
tween countries. (True) 
Compulsory Arbitration of Industrial Disputes 
The wage-earner has been compelled to use the strike 
to better his condition, and largely because the state has 
not afforded him needed protection. (True) 
Compulsory arbitration would practically prevent the 
peaceful settlement of labor disputes by the parties di-
rectly concerned. (False) 
Practically none of the efforts made thus far by em-
ployers and employees to settle their differences peace-
ably have proved successful. (False) 
American courts have not on the whole been as fair to 
the wage-earner as to the employer. (True) 
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The injunction in labor disputes can be used more ef-
fectively by the employer than by the employee. (True) 
The continual disputes between capital and labor 
show that some sort of compulsory arbitration is desir-
able. (False) 
Labor leaders and agitators are responsible for most 
of the trouble between employers and employees. 
(False) 
Organized labor's opposition to compulsory arbitra-
tion shows that it is not concerned in the welfare of the 
public. (False) 
Of these statements, seven pertain to the League of Nations, 
five to the tariff, and eight to compulsory arbitration of industrial 
disputes. The true and false statements are not distributed under 
the three general questions, in proportion to the total number of 
used statements on these questions. This asymmetrical distribution 
of true, false, and all used statements would not in itself seem to 
affect the reliability of scores, and certainly not comparative ratings 
for the various categories of voters, since this feature was uniform 
for them all. 
The score on a true-false test may be expressed as a fraction, of 
which the numerator is the number of statements correctly marked 
minus the number incorrectly marked, and the denominator the 
total number of statements in the test, including any that may not, 
in the particular case, have been marked at all. The highest score 
possible, according to this method, is 1. In the testing of pupils a 
negative score yielded by this method is counted as zero, the as-
sumption being that, in such a case, a preponderance of incorrect 
over correct markings is a matter of chance, so far as the pupil's 
knowledge is concerned. # 
As the computation of scores proceeded, doubt arose concerning 
the validity of this procedure unless it were adapted to the circum-
stances affecting the formation of popular opinions on public ques-
tions. More than twenty per cent (255) of the voters had nega-
tive scores, and more than eleven per cent (144) zero scores. No 
doubt many of the negative scores represented a chance prepon-
12 University of Kansas Humanistic Studies [12 
derance of incorrect over correct markings; but it is probable that 
an equal number of positive scores represented a like preponder-
ance of correct over incorrect markings; and, on these assumptions, 
such negative and positive scores would offset each other. Negative 
scores might therefore be taken to indicate the "conditioning" of 
voters to erroneous opinions, or rather, to a larger number of er-
roneous than of correct opinions. 
On this interpretation, a negative score is significant as a nega-
tive score and could not be properly treated as a zero score. Nega-
tive scores would seem to indicate (in a statistical sense) voters who, 
so far as political intelligence is concerned, are civic liabilities rather 
than civic assets. Pupils in school are not affected by comparable 
circumstances, since they are not conditioned by their instruction 
to erroneous opinions on topics covered by true-false tests. In the 
analysis that follows, negative scores have been accepted at their 
face value, and treated as negative numbers in the computation of 
averages and other statistical measures. This method, whether or 
no its validity be questioned as a general procedure, does not affect 
the comparative ratings of the various categories under which vot-
ers are classified, since, of course, it was applied to them all. Al l 
scores have been reduced to a percentage basis. According to this, 
the highest possible score is 100, and the lowest possible score 
(since negative scores are recognized) is —100. 
Scores are multiples of ten where all statements were marked, 
or where an even number of statements were left unmarked. 
An illustration will make this clear. If seventeen statements 
were marked correctly and three incorrectly, the score would be 
17—3 
—~—xl00==70. Most of the scores were, of course, multiples of 
ten. T h e comparatively small number (approximately one hun -
dred) that ended in the digit 5, because an odd number of state-
ments were left unmarked, have been assigned, alternately, to m u l -
tiples of ten just above and below the actual scores. This greatly 
facilitated computations, and represented no serious inaccuracy in 
the computation of statistical measures. 
A larger number of statements would probably have afforded 
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a more reliable test. The original number (30). was deliberately 
made small in order to minimize the labor of voters asked to co-
operate in the study. This procedure may be defended on the 
ground that the object was less to test the individual voter as such, 
than to appraise the intelligence of a considerable number of voters, 
and to compare the ratings of the various categories under which 
this number might be classified. It is probable, of course, that 
scores of individual voters respectively higher and lower than their 
several intelligences would justify, largely offset each other and 
affect the statistical results but slightly. 
These considerations have no bearing, however, on the relia-
bility (or dependability) of twenty compared with a larger num-
ber of statements as a test of political intelligence. Fortunately, the 
reliability of the number used can be estimated in exact terms. The 
ratings of all voters as a group on each of the twenty statements 
taken separately, the mean (arithmetic average) of these twenty 
ratings, and the standard error of this mean were computed. The 
mean score on all statements is 21.4, and the standard error is 5.9. 
This signifies that had a different number of statements been used 
(either larger or smaller), but selected in a similar way, the chances 
are two to one that the mean score would not have differed from 
the mean score on our twenty statements by more than 5.9. Or, in 
terms of the probable error (which is 67.45% of the standard er-
ror) , the chances are even that the mean score on any similar selec-
tion of statements would not have differed from the mean score 
on our twenty statements by more than 4.0. These are compara-
tively small quantities, considering the range of possible scores, 
which extends from —100 to +100 . The standard errors for spe-
cific categories of voters are of much the same order as that for the 
entire number, as will be seen by consulting Tables 20-25, which 
present the standard errors of the means of -fifteen statements (used 
for a special purpose) for the voters as a whole and for various 
classes thereof. The ratings of all voters as a group on each of the 
twenty statements are given in Table 19, with the accompanying 
footnote. 
An additional comment may be offered. An indefinite number 
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of statements such as figured in the test were not available for test 
purposes. In addition to meeting the criterion of scientific consen-
sus, the attempt was made to select statements that were neither 
too easy nor too difficult to provide a truly significant test, and that 
were of the sort featured in popular discussions of the three gen-
eral questions covered by the test. It was not easy to identify, as 
meeting these requirements, the comparatively small number act-
ually used, and it is certain that no very great number of such 
statements could have been found. This being so, ordinary statisti-
cal measures of "reliability" have only a limited significance in this 
case, presupposing, as they do, an indefinite number of statements 
from which various tests might have been constructed. Evaluation 
of the findings in terms of the specific statements of this test is, 
therefore, more important than any estimation of the test's reli-
ability in the conventional statistical sense. 
I l l 
SCORES ON T R U E - F A L S E T E S T OF P O L I T I C A L 
I N T E L L I G E N C E 
SEX AND RESIDENTIAL DISTRIBUTIONS 
Table 2 presents the distribution of scores on the true-false 
test, by sex and legal residence. Only two categories of legal resi-
dences are employed: Kansas, and States other than Kansas. Vot-
ers of the latter category are designated, for the sake of brevity, as 
non-Kansas voters, non-Kansas males, or non-Kansas females, as 
the case may be. 
The most striking feature of these figures is the low mean 
scores for all categories of voters, the highest mean score in any 
category being 29.1 for non-Kansas females. A second striking fea-
ture is the small range of mean scores from lowest to highest, 20.7 
to 29.1, a difference of only 8.4. Worthy of note also is the simi-
larity of standard deviations for all categories, the difference be-
tween the lowest and highest being only 3.1 / This would indicate 
approximately the same type of distribution for all categories. The 
similarity of mean scores and types of distribution for mutually 
exclusive categories of voters tends to create a presumption that the 
group as a whole is a fairly representative one. 
Figure 1 represents the distribution of scores for all voters. 
T h e graph approximates in form the normal curve of distribution 
(the so-called bell-shaped curve), though with moderate positive 
1 The high numerical values of standard deviations compared with mean scores are due 
to the fact that negative scores are recognized. Had the negative score —100 been made 
zero, the numerical values of all scores would have been increased by 100. The proper pro-
portions of standard deviations to mean scores would then have been readily apparent. 
For the convenience of readers unacquainted with statistical concepts, the significance 
of the standard deviation may be briefly explained. In a normal or slightly skewed dis-
tribution (the type represented by our group of voters and most of its specific classes), 
approximately two-thirds of all cases differ from the mean by various amounts ranging 
from zero to the value of the standard deviation. For example, the mean score of all 
voters is 21.4 and the standard deviation of the mean is 32.0, which means that approxi-
mately two-thirds of the group have scores falling within the limits of 21.4 lb 32.0, or 
from —10.6 to 53.4. There are, of course, no scores of just these values, since all scores 
are multiples of ten. Carrying the explanation a bit further, approximately 95% of all 
cases in this type of distribution differ from the mean by twice the standard deviation, or 
less, and approximately 99% by three times the standard deviation, or less. 
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skewness. I t will be seen that had all negative scores been counted 
as zero, the resulting distribution would have been markedly a~ 
symmetrical. The approximately normal distribution obtained by 
recognizing negative scores attests the validity of that procedure. 
Figure 2 shows the percentage distribution of scores for Kansas 
and non-Kansas voters; and Figure 3 shows a like distribution for 
male and female voters. Percentages are given in Table 3. The 
similarity of distribution for the several categories is clearly indi-
cated by the figures. 
More significant than mean scores, in some respects, is the dis-
tribution of individual scores on each side of a line assumed to di-
vide competent from incompetent voters. Opinions will naturally 
differ as to where, considering the nature of our test, such a line 
fror 
18 University of Kansas Humanistic Studies [ 1 8 
should be located. It might be argued that all voters with positive 
scores are civic assets, and should tend to support sound policies on 
public questions; that only voters with negative or zero scores 
should be regarded as civic liabilities, incapable of making positive 
contributions to public policy. It might be as readily argued, on the 
other hand, that only voters, with relatively high positive scores 
could be relied on for the most part to favor sound policies on pub-
lic questions, and could therefore rightly be regarded as competent 
citizens; and that those with lower scores increase the probabilities 
of unsound decisions, and place public policy on a lower level than 
20 60 40 60 
Scores 
2. Per Cent Distribution of Scores, Kansas and 
Non-Kansas Voters. 
100 
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14 
10 
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Per Cent Distribution of Scores, Male and Female Voters. 
it would be without their participation. As our test was a relatively 
easy one, dealing only with elementary matters of fact or opinion, 
and presupposing for correct judgments no great measure of in-
formation or independent thought, it seems reasonable to assume 
that competent citizens should have achieved relatively high scores. 
This assumption will be made as one basis for interpretation of the 
results. 2 
2 This type of analysis seems preferable, in the present study, to the analysis of skew-
ness in the distribution of scores. The abstract numbers in which skewness is expressed 
would have little but academic interest in this case, whereas percentages of the various 
categories with scores above and below the assumed level of civic competency are quite 
significant. 
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The assumption must, of course, be made specific, and it will 
be further assumed that only voters with scores of 50 or above are 
competent citizens, and that those with scores of 40 or below are 
incompetent as citizens. (As explained on page 12, all scores are 
multiples of ten). This second assumption is obviously somewhat 
arbitrary in character, as it would perhaps be quite as reasonable to 
place the line between competent and incompetent citizens either 
below or above the locus here chosen. No doubt some, for example, 
would assume that on such a test only voters with scores of 70 or 
above could rightly be judged competent citizens. On that assump-
tion fewer than ten per cent of our total number would qualify. 
The assumption here accepted would seem, all things considered, 
to imply a lenient conception of what civic competency involves. In 
any case, the debatable, arbitrary character of this assumption 
should not be lost sight of in the interpretation of results. There 
are no absolutes in such matters. 
Table 4 indicates the percentage distributions of scores grouped 
as specified, by sex and legal residence. In each category the per 
cent with scores of 50 or above is strikingly small compared with 
the per cent having lower scores. Remarkable, too, are the small 
differences between the various categories in this respect, the great-
est difference being only five per cent, that between Kansas males 
and non-Kansas females. Of interest, too, is the fact that as re-
Table 4. Percentage distribution of grouped scores, by sex and 
legal residence 
Per cent with Per cent with 
Category of voters scores of 40 scores of 50 
or below or above 
All voters 75.6 24.4 
All Kansans 76.3 23.7 
All non-Kansans 73.4 26.6 
All males 76.2 23.8 
All females 73.7 26.3 
Kansas males 76.9 23.1 
Kansas females 74.2 25.8 
Non-Kansas males 73.9 26.1 
Non-Kansas females 71.9 28.1 
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gards scores o£ 50 or above, females of all categories slightly out-
classed males of corresponding categories, and by approximately 
the same amount in each category. 
VOCATION AND POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE 
Sex and legal residence are less closely associated than other 
factors with differences in political intelligence. This is seen in the 
Scores 
0 5 10 15 ZD 25 30 & 4Ò 45 SO 55 
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Table 5. Mean scores, and percentage distribution of grouped 
scores, by vocational class 
Class Number Mean Standard Pet. scores Pet. scores 
in class score deviation 40 or below 50 or above 
Farmers 85 10.2 27.0 88.2 1 1 . 8 
Manual workers 215 17.1 24.8 87.9 12.1 
Non-manual workers 209 14.6 28.1 86.1 13.9 
Business proprietors 127 10.8 30.8 87.4 12.6 
Professional workers 297 38.5 34.0 50.2 49.8 
Housewives 141 15.1 32.1 82.3 17.7 
Unclassified 176 24.0 32.4 71.0 29.0 
All voters 1250 21.4 32.0 75.6 24.4 
analysis of scores by vocational class, presented in Table 5. As will 
be noted, mean scores and percentage distributions of grouped 
scores are quite similar for four of the six classes 3—Farmers, Man-
uals, Non-manuals and Business Proprietors. The comparatively 
low rating of business proprietors may occasion surprise j only one 
class having a lower mean score, and but two classes lower percent-
ages with scores of 50 or above. Housewives had a somewhat 
higher percentage of "competent citizens" (scores of 50 or above) 
than any of these classes, but their mean score was slightly below 
that of manual workers. Percentages of competent citizens were 
low for all these classes, ranging from 11.8 for farmers to 17.7 for 
housewives. Professionals were markedly superior to all other 
classes in both respects, having a mean score of 38.5, and 49.8 per 
cent with scores of 50 or above.4 
Table 6 presents a similar analysis for specific occupations rep-
resented by sufficient numbers to permit of statistical measures. 
3 Not counting Unclassified. 
4 The comparatively high rating of Unclassified on both measures is probably explicable 
by the inclusion of a large number who had combined teaching or study in college or uni-
versity with other occupations (which rendered them ineligible for other classifications). 
Teachers received high ratings compared with other occupational groups (see Table 6); 
and 250 college or university students who took the true-false test (the bulk of them 
juniors and seniors) made a mean score (39.3) somewhat higher than that of non-college 
teachers. Almost half of the total number in Unclassified had been thus occupied. Thirty-
two had been teachers and college or university students; thirty others had combined study 
in institutions of higher learning with other occupations; while twelve more had been 
engaged in teaching and other vocations. 
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Two entire vocational classes—farmers and housewives—are in-
cluded as specific occupational groups. The other groups are dis-
tributed among various vocational classes: barbers and carpenters 
coming in the Manuals -7 clerks and salesmen in the Non-manuals ; 
merchants in Business Proprietors -y and lawyers, clergymen, col-
lege teachers, and non-college teachers in Professionals. 
Mean scores range from 7.7 for merchants to 51.8 for college 
teachers, with clergymen and non-college teachers occupying posi-
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tions well toward the top, and farmers and salesmen not far from 
the bottom. Percentages of competent citizens (scores of 50 or 
above) in the various groups range somewhat differently, with bar-
bers taking the lowest position, followed by farmers and mer-
chants; and college teachers, clergymen and non-college teachers 
occupying the same relative positions as for mean scores. 
Graphic representations of the showings on the two measures, 
for vocational classes and specific occupational groups, are given in 
Figures 4 and 5, 
It is unnecessary, perhaps, to point out that vocational influences 
affecting political intelligence are quite complex. Vocation itself is 
selective of intelligence, at least of specific kinds, and this selectiv-
ity no doubt bears some relation to differentiations of political in-
telligence. Vocational and related activities contribute in widely 
varying measure to the development of interest and intelligence in 
public affairs. Educational training requisite to engagement in the 
various vocations also differs greatly in both content and amount. 
Of these influences the present study covered only amount of 
schooling, though without relating it explicitly to vocational classi-
fications. The study also covered certain reading habits that must 
Tabic 6. Mean scores, and percentage distribution of grouped 
scores, by specific occupation 
Occupational group Number Mean Standard Pet. scores Pet. scores 
in group score deviation 4-0 or below 50 or above 
Farmers 85 10.2 27.0 88.2 11.8 
Barbers 39 16.9 22.6 92.3 7.7 
Carpenters 21 17.6 28.9 76.2 23.8 
Clerks 50 16.6 25.3 86.0 14.0 
Salesmen 57 11.2 27.6 86.0 14.0 
Merchants 86 7.7 31.5 87.2 12.8 
Lawyers 22 17.3 44.7 68.2 31.8 
Clergymen 29 44.8 31.2 44.8 55.2 
College teachers 92 51.8 29.8 35.9 64.1 
Other teachers 97 36.6 31.6 51.5 48.5 
Housewives 141 15.1 32.1 82.3 17.7 
All voters 1250 21.4 32.0 75.6 24.4 
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be more or less affected by vocational influences, but these interre-
lations were not analyzed. 
SCHOOLING AND POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE 
The questionnaire item on schooling was so devised as to per-
mit the reduction of school attendance to a uniform quantitative 
basis. According to the most common classification, and the one 
accepted for purposes of this study, graduation from the elementary 
school signifies eight years of schooling, high-school graduation 
four additional years, and graduation from college another four 
years. 
Many voters, of course, had attended school before present 
grades and divisions were established. They were instructed to 
record the equivalents of their schooling as nearly as possible in 
terms of classifications now current. Similarly, the full-time equiv-
alents of part-time instruction were to be indicated. Where it 
seemed necessary, the data were edited in conformity with the uni-
form basis of classification thus set up. For example, voters re-
cording nine years of elementary school attendance were credited 
with only eight years, and those reporting graduation from the 
high school in three years were credited with four years of secon-
dary schooling. With all such revisions, however, only an approx-
imation to uniformity could be attained. The data could doubtless 
have borne much more editing, had the requisite information been 
available. Moreover, schooling twenty or thirty or forty years 
ago has no exact equivalents in schooling today, because formal 
education has changed so radically. Differences in the content and 
quality of instruction, whether between schools of the same or of 
different periods, could not be reached by a questionnaire such as 
was employed. The likelihood that some voters exaggerated the 
amounts of their schooling only needs mentioning. To what degree 
it may invalidate comparisons there is, of course, no basis for judg-
ing. • 
Table 7 presents mean scores on the true-false test, and per-
centage distributions of grouped scores, by amount of schooling. 
The lack of any consistent relation between scores and amount 
of schooling is apparent on even a casual inspection of the figures. 
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Not until the twelfth year of schooling has been passed does an 
upward trend appear, either in mean scores or in percentages with 
scores of 50 or above ; and not until the fourteenth year is reached 
(the sophomore year in college) do the ratings on both measures 
become consistently higher than for all lesser amounts of schooling 
(not counting those with a negligible number of representatives). 
Some striking anomalies are presented by the figures. Voters 
who completed the ninth year of schooling (the first year of the 
Table 7. Mean scores, and percentage distribution of grouped 
scores, by amount of schooling 
Amount of Number Mean Standard Pet. scores Pet. scores 
schooling of voters score deviation 40 or below SO or above 
in years 
0 1 10.0 
l 0 
2 1 40.0 
3 5 32.0 
4 22 7.7 28.3 90.9 9.1 
5 21 15.2 26.0 85.7 14.3 
6 47 13.6 25.3 87.2 12.8 
7 35 16J 25.6 82.9 17.1 
8 218 13.0 26.7 89.0 11.0 
9 45 8.2 30.9 88.9 11.1 
10 76 17.2 28.7 84.2 15.8 
11 15 16.1 23.5 84.3 15.7 
12 170 11.5 29.0 89.4 10.6 
13 72 15.8 31.2 83.3 16.7 
14 81 19.3 30.6 79.0 21.0 
15 67 24.6 33.1 68.7 31.3 
16 101 30.3 33.3 60.4 39.6 
17 80 47.5 30.5 40.0 60.0 
18 44 31.1 30.4 61.4 38.6 
19 43 54.4 35.2 32.6 67.4 
*20 or more 40 47.5 31.5 30.0 70.0 
Not specified 30 25.0 
All voters 1250 21.4 32.0 75.6 24.4 
* Voters in this category had an estimated average schooling of 21 years. 
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5 Letting X represent amount of schooling in years, and Y mean score on the true-false 
test, the average relationship of Y and X for all amounts of schooling is expressed by the 
regression equation Y = _ 7 8 + 2 41 X 
The standard error (S y ) is 7.7; and the coefficient of correlation (r) is + . 8 0 . (Technical 
terms are explained at the end of this footnote.) 
The relationship between the two variables for all amounts of schooling from 0 to 12 
years is expressed in the equation Y 0 22 X 
The standard error (Sy) is 3.1; and the coefficient of correlation (r) is — . 1 6 . These 
measures would indicate a negative correlation between schooling and political intelli-
gence, for schooling- up to twelve years. While the coefficient of correlation is small, it is 
more than four times its standard error (a r ==.037) and may therefore be accepted as 
significant. 
We should expect, as a corollary of these findings, a closer association between school-
ing and political intelligence, for the series of 13 to 20 years or more of schooling. This 
expectation is borne out by the statistical analysis. The average relationship of Y (mean 
score) and X (amount of schooling) is expressed in the equation 
Y = 47.7 + 4.94 X 
The standard error (S y ) Is 6.3; and the coefficient of correlation (r) is + . 8 7 . 
The statistical measures for the various schooling series are brought together in Table 8. 
high school) had a lower mean score than any except the four-year 
group, and rated fourth lowest in percentages with scores of 50 
or above. High-school graduates (the twelve-year group) were 
excelled, in mean scores, by all groups with less schooling except 
the four- and nine-year groups ; and, in percentage of competent 
citizens, by all except the four-year group. Similarly, the eighteen-
year group (voters who completed two years of post-graduate 
study) had a lower mean score than the seventeen-year group, 
and a lower percentage with scores of 50 or above than either the 
seventeen- or the sixteen-year group. These anomalies will be dis-
cussed later. 
Mean scores by amounts of schooling are graphically repre-
sented in Figure 6. Inspection of the diagram at once raises a doubt 
whether the relations between the two variables can best be de-
scribed in terms of a single linear correlation covering all amounts 
of schooling. Measures of such a correlation were, however, com-
puted. While these are significant, more instructive results are ob-
tained by dividing the schooling series into two segments, with 
high-school graduation (completion of twelfth year) as the point 
of division. Correlations were calculated for the two series thus 
obtained: 0 to 12 years, and 13 to 20 years and beyond. (Voters 
with 20 years or more of schooling were grouped together 5 the 
estimated average amount of their schooling was 21 years.) 5 
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The most significant conclusions from the statistical analysis are 
( 1 ) that there is little connection between political intelligence and 
schooling up to and including high-school graduation5 and (2) 
that there is a fairly close and consistent association of the two vari-
ables beyond that point. These conclusions apply, of course, only 
to types of schooling offered in the past. But they apply to school-
ing of the recent past, and therefore such as is offered at the pres-
ent time, since almost ten per cent (123) of the voters studied were 
It should be borne in mind that the dependent variable is the mean score of the schooling 
group, not the score of the individual voter. This gives coefficients of correlation higher, 
and standard errors lower, than obtain for individual scores. Measures of the relations 
between schooling and individual scores were computed for 998 voters (for whom partial 
and multiple correlations were also computed). For this entire number (with schooling of 
0 to 20 years or more), the coefficient of correlation is -J-.296? for 614 of this group 
(with schooling of 0 to 12 years) the coefficient is —.018; and for 384 of the same group 
(schooling, 13 to 20 years or more) the coefficient is -{-.294. The coefficient of the group, 
0 to 12 years, is too small to be of any significance. The regression coefficients for these 
groups, in the order given, are 2.29, —0.15 and 4.61, respectively. The small differences 
between these and corresponding coefficients when the mean score is taken as the dependent 
variable are due to exclusion from one series of many voters included in the other. 
It will be seen that statistical measures have high predictive values when the mean 
score is taken as the dependent variable, but relatively low values when the individual 
score is the variable. The significance of such measures will depend, of course, on the 
specific uses made of them. If, to take a hypothetical example, the suffrage were limited 
to the politically intelligent, statistical measures of this sort would be extremely valuable 
if the unit of selection were the schooling groupy but much less valuable if the selectional 
unit were the individual voter. 
For partial and multiple correlations of schooling and other measurable factors with 
the test scores, see p. 50. 
For the benefit of readers not familiar with statistical concepts, certain terms that figure 
in the discussion from this point on may be explained. Regression equations are ordinary 
algebraic equations expressing the relationships of two or more "unknown" quantities (or 
"variables") to each other. Thus, if one substituted 10 for X (years of schooling) In the 
first equation above, the computed score (Y) would be 16.3. 
The regression coefficient is simply the numerical coefficient of the independent variable 
(for example, 2.41 in the same equation above). 
The standard error (S y ) is an estimate of the "reliability" of values of the dependent 
variable (mean scores in the present case) computed according to the regression equation. 
It is quite similar in meaning to the standard deviation of the mean, explained on p. 15. 
Taking the same illustration, the standard error of 7.7 signifies that there are two chances 
to one that the actual mean score of voters with ten years of schooling would not differ 
more than that amount from the mean score computed according to the regression equation, 
or 16.3. 
The coefficient of correlation (r) expresses the degree of relationship between the vari-
ables, or unknown quantities, of the regression equation (in this case, X and Y) . Corre-
lation varies from 1, which is perfect correlation, to 0, which is absence of any correlation. 
Positive (or -{-) correlation means that as one variable increases, the other also increases j 
and negative (or —) correlation means that as one Increases, the other decreases. 
A coefficient of correlation is considered of little or no significance unless it is at least 
three times its standard error (symbolically expressed, tr r). 
Readers still bothered by these terms will find in the text discussion non-technical ex-
planations of the main results. 
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IN THE age group of 21 to 24- years, and more than fifteen per cent 
(193) in the age group of 25 to 29 years: a sufficiently large per-
centage, taking both groups, for the influence of recent schooling 
to be reflected in the figures for the entire selection. 
In interpreting the results the bearing of selective factors— 
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FIG. 6 . RELATION BETWEEN SCHOOLING AND SCORES ON TRUE-FALSE TEST. 
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specifically, what is sometimes termed the educational "sieve"— 
should not be overlooked. There are no definite indications in the 
data that high-school attendance is selective o£ superior "general 
intelligence," such as might be reflected in scores on true-false tests 
of political intelligence 3 but this does not, of course, prove that no 
such selectivity is there involved. It is quite certain, however, that 
institutions of higher learning are selective in this sense. Moreover, 
attendance at such institutions is a prerequisite to engagement in 
certain vocations, particularly professional callings, whose interests 
and activities may be more conducive to the growth of political in-
telligence than those of other occupations. The final conclusion is 
somewhat problematic. No doubt higher education contributes Sub-
stantially to superior political intelligence, but we cannot say on the 
basis of the data just how much it contributes, because the data 
reflect selective as well as educational influences. 
Table 8. Correlations between schooling and mean scores on 
true-false test 
Amount of Number of Regression equation of Y Standard Coefficient of 
schooling voters (mean score) on X (schooling) error (S y ) correlation (r) 
0 ' o r more' 1 2 2 0 Y = 7.8+2.41X 7.7 + . 8 0 
0 t o i 2 y r , *92 Y - 15 .2~0 .22X 3.1 - . 1 6 
UlrlT 5 2 8 Y = - 4 7 . 7 + 4 . 9 4 X 6-3 + . 8 7 
Some of the anomalies in the comparative ratings of the school-
ing groups may be briefly discussed. The fluctuations in mean 
scores for the first twelve years of schooling may perhaps be due 
to accidents of the literally random selection of cases. Certain 
marked fluctuations might be differently explained. The low com-
parative rating of the nine-year group (both in mean score and in 
percentage of "competent citizens") may be connected with the 
fact that many high-school students drop out at the end of their 
first year because of incapacity for work of high-school grade. The 
comparatively low rating of the eighteen-year group (on both 
measures) may be connected with the vicissitudes of study for 
graduate degrees. Perhaps many with this amount of schooling 
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were obliged, because o£ limited intellectual ability, to spend two 
years in satisfying requirements for a master's degree (whereas one 
year is the normal amount) ; and perhaps others, aspirants for the 
doctor's degree, became discouraged in their second year of gradu-
ate study with their limited progress toward this goal, and aban-
doned their efforts to attain it. These, of course, are purely hypo-
thetical explanations that might not be supported by factual evi-
dence, were such evidence available. 
READING HABITS AND POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE 
Schooling, of course, has some influence on reading habits: The 
present study sought information on the relations between political 
intelligence and the perusal of daily and periodical publications. 
The voter was asked to specify the number of daily newspapers 
read, and also the names of magazines or periodicals read regularly. 
Table 9. Mean scores, and percentage distribution of grouped 
scores, by number of daily newspapers read 
Number of Number of Mean Standard Pet. scores Pet, scores 
papers read voters score deviation 40 or below SO or above 
0 16 15.6 27.0 81.3 18.7 
1 241 24.9 30.7 72.6 27.4 
2 597 20.1 32.0 77.7 22.3 
3 313 19.5 31.6 77.6 22.4 
4 51 27.5 37.0 60.8 39.2 
5 20 29.0 33.2 70.0 30.0 
6 5 48.0 
7 2 20.0 
Not specified 5 38.0 
All voters 1250 21.4 32.0 75.6 24.4 
Table 9 presents mean scores on the true-false test, and per-
centage distributions of grouped scores, by number of daily news-
papers read. Figure 7 represents graphically the relations between 
the two variables. I t will be observed that the small number of 
voters who read no daily newspaper had a lower mean score, and 
lower percentage with scores of 50 or above, than any other group; 
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and that readers of two or of three dailies rated lower on both 
measures of political intelligence than readers either of one or of 
four or five dailies.6 
The statistical analysis would indicate only a slight positive 
correlation between political intelligence and the perusal of daily 
O 
O 
y so 
Fig. 
Number of Papers Read^X 
7. Relation Between Perusal of Daily Newspapers and 
Scores on True-False Test. 
The average relationship between the two variables, Y (mean score) and X (number 
of daily newspapers read), is expressed in the equation: Y = 20.7 + 0.32 X. The standard 
error of estimate (S y ) is 3.1, and the coefficient of correlation (r) is - f .14-. 
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newspapers. This may, however, somewhat obscure the significance 
of data presented in the table. Why the readers of only one daily 
should have a mean score above the mean for all voters, and the 
readers of two or three dailies mean scores below that figure, one 
can not say—there is no basis of judging. These three categories— 
readers of one, two, and three dailies, respectively—included 1151, 
or 92.4 per cent, of all voters (1245) who specified the number 
of dailies read. The coefficient of correlation reflects mostly the 
scores of these numerically preponderant groups (and is of doubt-
ful significance for that reason). Yet it is significant that voters 
who read no daily newspaper rated substantially lower, in mean 
scores and percentages of "competent citizens", than any other 
group, though selective influences may be here involved -y and the 
fact that readers of four or five dailies rated higher, on both meas-
ures, than readers of any smaller number probably has some sig-
nificance, although we cannot say, on the basis of the data, just 
what it is. The fact remains, however, that, barring voters who 
read no daily newspaper, the relation between political intelligence 
and perusal of daily newspapers appears to be somewhat tenuous.7 
Voters were asked to specify names of magazines and periodi-
cals read regularly ; and field workers were instructed to advise 
voters that periodical publications of all classes should be reported. 
Data thus secured permitted statistical analyses of relations between 
"political intelligence" and number of magazines read, and also 
between that and the perusal of particular publications. 
Table 10 presents mean scores, and percentage distributions of 
grouped scores, by number of magazines read regularly. Figure 8 
7 One unforeseen circumstance introduced an element of unreliability in reports of voters 
on the number of daily newspapers read. A large percentage of voters lived within the 
territory where The Kansas City Star and its morning edition, The Kansas City Times, are 
widely read. There is reason to believe that some readers of both these papers reported 
it as one paper, whereas they should have reported it as two. Corrections were made where 
possible, but this could not be done in most cases, since the voter was asked to specify only 
the number of daily newspapers read. In many instances names were reported, which 
permitted a check to be made. There is no basis for estimating how serious are the errors 
thus occasioned. 
The coefficient of correlation between individual scores and number of newspapers read 
for the same group of voters (1245) is + . 0 1 2 . This is too small, being less than its 
standard error, to indicate any association of the two variables. The regression equation 
is, of course, identical with that for mean scores. 
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represents graphically the relations between the two variables. A 
mere glance at the figures shows that ratings on both measures in-
crease as the number of magazines read regularly increases, though 
there are fluctuations.8 
Table 10. Mean scores, and percentage distribution of grouped 
scores, by number of magazines read regularly 
Number of Number of Mean Standard Pet. scores Pet, scores 
magazines voters score deviation 40 or below 50 or above 
0 289 13.3 28.3 88.2 11.8 
l 129 16.0 28.4 82.9 17.1 
2 208 21.9 29.2 77.9 22.1 
3 228 19.6 30.6 78.5 21.5 
4 126 22.2 34.7 73.0 26.7 
5 80 25.6 33.3 71.3 28.7 
6 38 37.1 35.2 50.0 50.0 
7 19 46.3 32.5 36.8 63.2 
CO
 
11 42.7 
9 5 48.0 
10 or more * 24 61.3 27.9 16.7 83.3 
Not specified 93 27.1 
All voters 1250 21.4 32.0 75.6 24.4 
* Estimated mean, 11.3. 
As in other relationships, selective influences are involved. 
Perusal of magazines doubtless reflects, in some measure, level of 
"general intelligence", as well as amount of schooling, vocational 
8 The average relationship between mean scores (Y) and the number of magazines read 
regularly (X) is expressed in the equation: Y = 11.9 + 3.60 X. The standard error of 
estimate (Sy) is 3.2, and the coefficient of correlation (r) is -\-.93. These measures indicate, 
of course, a close relationship between political intelligence and the perusal of periodical 
publications. 
The coefficient of correlation between individual scores and number of periodicals read 
regularly (taking the 998 cases available for partial and multiple correlations) is -[-.25. 
The regression equation is: Y = 12.1 -f- 3.63 X. The same observation applies here as 
in case of schooling, respecting predictive values of measures of relationship for individual 
and mean scores, respectively. See p. 50 for partial and multiple correlations of test scores 
with perusal of periodicals and other measurable factors. 
The reliability of all the measures of relationship between these two variables is affected 
by the asymmetrical distribution of voters among the various classes of magazine readers. 
The large number of voters reading no magazines accounts for the marked asymmetry of 
the distribution. See Figure 9. 
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interests, and other factors that have an influence on political in-
telligence, independent of magazine reading as such. 
Table 11 presents mean scores, and percentage distributions of 
grouped scores, for readers of specified magazines. It covers only 
publications represented by sufficient voters to allow the applica-
tion of statistical measures. To facilitate comparisons, the order of 
O * 2 3 4 5 S 7 & d H > l / l Z 
Number of Periodicals *X 
Fig. 8. Relation Between Periodicals Read Regularly AND SCORES 
on True-False Test, 
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Tabic I L Mean scores, and percentage distribution of grouped 
scores, of readers of specified periodicals * 
No, of voters 
Periodical reading 
Mean 
score 
Standard 
deviation 
Pet. scores 
40 or below 
Pet. scores 
50 or above 
New Republic 55 66.0 24.7 14.5 85.5 
Nation 30 62.0 24.8 13.3 86.7 
Survey 29 58.3 28.6 27.6 72.4 
Christian Century 18 57.2 23.5 27.8 72.2 
Century 19 56.3 33.9 21.1 78.9 
Scribner's 16 55.0 31.4 25.0 75.0 
American Mercury 38 52.9 26.5 31.6 68.4 
Atlantic Monthly 64 50.0 31.5 34.4 65.6 
Harper's 31 48.7 39.4 38.7 61.3 
Time 23 48.3 31.3 34.8 65.2 
Life 15 46.7 28.4 40.0 60.0 
Current History 21 44.8 40.2 42.9 57.1 
Forum 16 41.3 36.1 43.7 56.3 
World's Work 58 35.0 34.3 53.4 46.6 
Good Housekeeping 29 34.1 32.4 65.5 34.5 
Dearborn Independent 15 32.7 22.0 73.3 26.7 
Collier's 56 30.4 30.3 58.9 41.1 
Am. Rev. of Revs. 50 30.0 31.3 68.0 32.0 
Liberty- 42 26.9 34.7 69.1 31.0 
Literary Digest 
McCall's 
348 25.8 33.2 69.0 31.0 
25 24.0 33.9 76.0 24.0 
Geographic 100 23.8 32.3 69.0 31.0 
Hearst's 24 22.5 32.2 79.2 20.8 
Outlook 22 21.8 34.5 68.2 31.8 
American Magazine 297 21.3 31.5 74.1 25.9 
Pathfinder 25 21.2 27.5 72.0 28.0 
Saturday Evening Post 270 21.0 29.0 77.8 22.2 
Red Book 32 18.1 23.1 87.5 12.5 
Ladies' Home Journal 95 15.8 32.7 78-9 21.1 
Cosmopolitan 51 14.9 31.4 84.3 15.7 
Woman's Home Comp, . 49 12.4 33.5 77.6 22.4 
Capper's Weekly 33 12.4 33.1 81.8 18.2 
Country Gentleman 41 10.7 30.4 87.8 12.2 
Delineator 
O
O
 6.7 35.9 83.3 16.7 
All voters 1250 21.4 32.0 75.6 24.4 
* A few of these publications have been c liscontinued since the data were collected. 
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presentation is from high to low mean scores. This does not cor-
respond, except as to general trend, with the order of high to low 
percentages of "competent" citizens. 
Wha t was said about selective influences relative to magazine 
reading in general applies, with qualifications, to the perusal of 
particular publications. Attention should be called to the fact that 
Number of Periodicals 
Fig. 9. Distribution of Voters by Number of Periodicals 
Read Regularly. 
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many journals listed in the table give little or no space to the dis-
cussion of public affairs, and to the probability that many readers 
of journals which do include such discussions limit their attention 
to other features. Ratings of readers on the two statistical meas-
ures are therefore not to be accepted, without qualification, as re-
liable indices to the standards represented by the various maga-
zines themselves, even in their treatment of public questions. 
PARTISAN AFFILIATIONS AND POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE 
The voter was asked to specify the party voted for "most fre-
quently." Scores on the true-false test have been classified and 
analyzed according to the political preferences thus recorded. A 
great majority of the voters were, of course, Republicans or Demo-
crats, a preponderance of them Republicans, owing to the strongly 
Republican complexion of the localities in which most of the voters 
were concentrated. A considerable number stated that they were 
"independent" in politics, or supported "the best man," or voted 
for members of various parties, or otherwise disavowed partisan 
preferences. All such were classified as "Independents." Only a 
small number of Socialists was reached by the study, and other 
minor parties were scarcely represented at all. 
Mean scores, and percentage distributions of grouped scores, 
by political party are presented in Table 12, and graphically rep-
resented in Figure 10. Contrary to the practice in other cases, both 
statistical measures have been applied to the very small number of 
Socialists, because of the probable interest in their ratings. 
Table 12. Mean scores, and percentage distribution of grouped 
scores, by political preference 
Political Number of Mean Standard Pet. scores Pet. scores 
preference voters score deviation 4-0 or below 50 or above 
Democratic 349 27.1 29.3 73.6 26.4 
Republican 751 15.8 31.5 80.2 19.8 
Socialist 10 55.0 21.6 30.0 70.0 
Independent 135 34.7 34.5 59.3 40.7 
Others, including 
1 unspecified 5 32.0 
All voters 1250 21.4 32.0 75.6 24.4 
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above by Political Party 
Fig. 10. 
The order of ratings from high to low, on both measures, is 
from Socialist to Independent to Democratic to Republican. This 
is also the same as the order of increasing size—from smallest to 
largest—of the various groups. 
Interpretation of the marked differences between these groups 
must necessarily be somewhat speculative. Differential selectivities 
should perhaps be weighted rather heavily. A minority, and espe-
cially a minor, party probably attracts to its banner relatively more 
Scores 
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voters of independent judgment than a majority party. W e should 
therefore expect Republicans to rate lower in heavily Republican 
communities than members of other parties. In predominantly 
Democratic communities we might reasonably expect the compara-
tive ratings of Democrats and Republicans to be the reverse. Simi-
larly, it commonly requires a higher degree of intelligence and in-
dependence to identify oneself with an unorthodox group such as 
the Socialist party than with the heterogeneous class known as In-
dependents who are, by comparison, highly respectable. "Inde-
pendence" usually means, of course, a readiness to support either 
of the two major parties, depending on issues, personalities and 
other circumstances of the particular campaign. It is more often 
associated with superior intelligence than undeviating adherence 
to one of the two dominant parties. 
The lower ratings of Republicans than of Democrats may also 
be due, in part, to a wider divergence of Republican doctrines from 
expert judgments on statements covered by the test. A comparison 
of partisan teachings on the tariff, the League of Nations, and the 
compulsory arbitration of industrial disputes (particularly, as re-
gards the latter, in the State of Kansas at the time the test was ad-
ministered) would seem to support this proposition. This, of 
course, does not imply that Republican teachings on other questions 
depart more widely than Democratic teachings from the consensus 
of expert opinion. Indeed, there is some evidence, though it is not 
altogether conclusive, that Republicans rated higher than Demo-
crats on the League of Nations statements. On five of those state-
ments (used for a special purpose) the mean score of Republicans 
was higher, but the standard error of the mean was much higher in 
their case, this indicating that the mean was less reliable as a meas-
ure of intelligence. (See Table 24.) 
AGE AND POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE 
Age, of course, does not represent a specific factor in political 
intelligence, but rather the development, the growth or decline, of 
the manifold influences associated with sex, schooling, vocation, 
reading habits, partisan interests, and other phases of behavior and 
experience that affect political attitudes and opinions. I t also rep-
41] Eldridge: Public Intelligence 4 1 
resents the maturation of a man's "general intelligence", with 
whatever bearing this may have on his political intelligence. The 
data on relationships between age and scores on the true-false test 
are to be viewed from the perspective thus indicated. 
Table 13. Mean scores, and percentage distribution of grouped 
scores, by age 
Age group Number in Mean Standard Pet. scores Pet, scores 
group score deviation 40 or below 50 or above 
21-24 years 1 2 3 2 8 . 2 30 .4 68 .3 31 .7 
25-29 yy 1 9 3 2 1 . 4 31 .2 77 .2 22.8 
30-34 yy 1 2 0 26 .8 32 .3 - 67 .5 32.5 
35-39 yy 1 2 8 26.1 31.3 74 .2 25.8 
40-44 yy 1 6 0 2 0 . 4 32.5 7 6 . 9 23.1 
45-49 yy 1 0 5 17.8 32.8 79 .0 21 .0 
50-54 yy 1 0 0 17 .4 ' 32.5 80 .0 20.0 
55-59 yy 8 0 13.9 32.8 80 .0 20 .0 
60-64 yy 3 8 11.6 29 .3 86.8 13.2 
65-69 yy 2 6 17.3 35 .6 76 .9 23.1 
70-74 yy 14- 16 .4 
75-79 yy 11 19.1 
Not specified 1 5 2 21 .6 
All voters 1 2 5 0 2 1 . 4 32.0 75 .6 24 .4 
These data are presented in Table 13, and those relative to 
mean scores are graphically represented in Figure l l . 9 One is 
struck on a glance at the table by the steady decline in mean scores 
from the 21-24 year group to the 60-64 group, interrupted only 
by the 25-29 group, which had a substantially lower score than 
either the preceding or the succeeding group. There is a corre-
9 The voter was asked merely to specify year of birth. His age was computed by sub-
tracting that from the year in which he filled out the questionnaire. Age thus computed 
could vary from almost a year less to almost a year more than actual age, depending on 
the voter's birthday and the day of the year on which the questionnaire was administered. 
There is thus some overlapping of the age groups in which voters have been classified. 
The inaccuracies are probably, however, mutually compensatory; and the midpoints used in 
measuring relationships are scarcely affected. Due cognizance was taken of the fact that 
voters with a computed age of 21 could not have an actual age less than that. 
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sponding decline in percentages of competent citizens, though with 
more fluctuations,10 
The negative correlation of age and political intelligence is con-
trary to what might have been expected, since it is generally sup-
posed that we grow in wisdom if not in knowledge with advancing 
years. Interpretation is not easy. We do not know whether intel-
ligence in other directions is correlated with age. If we did, we 
1 0 The average relationship between the two variables, mean score (Y) and age (X) , 
Ì3 expressed in the equation: Y = 3 2 . 8 — 0.286 X. The standard error of estimate by this 
equation (Sy) is 2.9} and the coefficient of correlation (r) is —.80. These measures indi-
cate, of course, a close negative relationship between age and political intelligence. 
The average relationship between age and individual scores (998 cases) is expressed in 
the equation: Y (score) = 32 .0— 0.282 X (age)* and the coefficient of correlation (r) is 
—.11. 
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should be able to determine whether the negative association of 
age and political intelligence is exceptional, and therefore to be 
accounted for by special circumstances. Some of the possibilities 
may, however, be considered. 
It is probable that the younger age-groups had more schooling 
than older ones, and that, in particular, a larger percentage had 
some "college education". If so, their different ratings on the two 
measures of political intelligence might thus be accounted for in 
whole or in part, since, as was shown, schooling beyond high-school 
graduation is closely correlated with political intelligence. Partial 
and multiple correlations of age, schooling, and perusal of periodi-
cals with individual scores tend to support this hypothesis.11 
The hypothesis would, however, leave unexplained the gradual 
increase in mean scores after the 60-64 year group is passed. It 
may be suggested as a complementary hypothesis that increasing ab-
sorption of the voter from his majority onward in domestic, occu-
pational, and other non-civic interests is largely responsible for his 
relatively low intelligence in public affairs. There is no doubt, gen-
erally speaking, that adult interests are increasingly centered, from 
early manhood to old age, in family and vocational responsibilities. 
The civic interests that may have been developed in school prob-
ably decline in proportion. Our institutional arrangements make 
little provision for their post-school cultivation. Citizens as such 
are not organized for study of public questions and participation in 
public affairs. Other interests are organized and by their pressure 
gradually push civic interests into the background. This hypothesis 
is compatible with the increase of mean scores in case of the last 
three age-groups, for when the age of sixty-five is reached the pres-
sure of domestic and occupational responsibilities is apt to be some-
what diminished, releasing time and attention for other interests, 
of which public affairs may claim a share. 
SOCIAL MOBILITY AND POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE 
Data were secured regarding voters and their fathers which 
throw some light on the relationships between political intelligence 
" See pp. 50-51. 
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and certain kinds of social mobility. One species of mobility is 
denoted by difference in State of birth and State of legal residence. 
Table 14 presents mean scores, and percentage distributions of 
grouped scores, by difference or identity of birthplace and legal 
residence, with geographic division rather than State as the basis 
of distinction. Those of different birthplace and residence are fur-
ther subdivided into native-born and foreign-born voters. 
Table 14. Mean scores, and percentage distribution of grouped 
scores, by identity or difference of geographic divisions 
of birthplace and of residence 
Class of voters Number in Mean Standard Pet. scores Pet. scores 
class score deviation 40 or below 50 or above 
Birthplace and re$i- p A o 
dence identical 19.4 31.6 78.8 21.2 
Birthplace and resi-
dence different OQ1 
(native-born voters) 25.8 37.7 68.5 31.5 
Foreign-born voters 4 8 * 19.8 29.5 79.2 20.8 
State of birth o 
not specified 13.3 
All voters 1250 21.4 32.0 75.6 24.4 
•Nativity distributed as follows: England, Scotland, and Wales, 10j Germany and Austria, 
9* Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, 85 Canada, 5 ; Ireland, 4 j Russia, 4 5 other countries, 8. 
As age represents the time factor, so difference between birth-
place and residence represents a kind of space factor in influences 
conditioning political intelligence. This, of course, varies widely 
for voters whose birthplace and residence are in different geographic 
divisions, ranging from the difference between two contiguous States 
falling in separate geographic divisions, to that between two widely 
separated divisions, or between a foreign country and the United 
States. Naturally, space factors in a similar but more limited sense 
condition voters residing in the geographic division of their birth. 
It will be seen that, of native-born voters, those whose birth-
place and legal residence fall in different geographic divisions have 
substantially higher ratings on both measures of political intelli-
gence, than those with identical divisions with respect to birth and 
residence j and that even foreign-born voters, despite cultural 
handicaps, fall but little below the ratings of all voters, while com-
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ing up to those of voters with identical birthplace and residence 
(slightly above on one measure and slightly below on the other). 
Probably selective as well as social influences are responsible 
for these differences. Not unlikely, migrants from one geographic 
division to another, or from foreign countries to the United States, 
are more often characterized than non-migrants by initiative, curi-
osity and imagination of a sort conducive to political intelligence. 
Moreover, new social contacts going with the change doubtless 
tend to challenge old beliefs and attitudes, and intensify interest 
in public questions. Migrants from abroad, particularly those aspir-
ing to American citizenship, are naturally curious about political 
matters here, and perhaps more active than the majority of native-
born citizens in seeking information about them. 
Table 15 presents a comparison of voters whose legal residences 
were respectively identical with and different from the birthplaces 
of their fathers, taking geographic division as the basis of distinction 
between identity and difference. Voters with residences different 
from the birthplaces of their fathers are subdivided into those with 
native- and foreign-born fathers, respectively. The latter are fur-
ther classified by the nationalities of their fathers, when groups 
thus differentiated are large enough to permit of statistical meas-
ures. 
The three main categories differ very little as regards mean 
scores, or percentage distributions of grouped scores. Mobility of 
the sort involved appears to have little if any influence on political 
intelligence. This might or might not have been expected. Hypo-
thetical explanations of the facts as we find them are readily of-
fered. The mobility in question is, so to speak, diluted over a long 
time span, and broken in two by the cleavage between successive 
generations. Two-generation mobility does not necessarily imply 
mobility of voters (the second generation in this case), particularly 
after the voting age is reached. We might perhaps have antici-
pated that differentials in selective factors, such as initiative and 
intellectual capacity, would have a bearing on political intelligence, 
but the data do not in themselves support such a supposition. 
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Table 15. Mean scores, and percentage distribution of grouped 
scores, by identity or difference of geographic divisions 
of voter's residence and of father's birthplace 
Class of voters Number Mean Standard Pet. scores Pet. scores 
in class score deviation 40 or below 50 or above 
Voter's residence and 
father's birthplace 
identical 255 21.6 30.6 76.9 23.1 
Voter's residence and 
father's birthplace 
different (fathers 
native-born) 753 21.5 32.7 74.4 25.6 
Voters with fathers 
born in foreign 
countries * 230 21.0 30.9 78.3 21.7 
In England, Scot-
land, or Wales 56 28.9 28.1 69.6 30 .4 
In Ireland 21 21.4 35.9 71 .4 28.6 
In Norway, Sweden, 
or Denmark 33 20.6 27.9 87.9 12.1 
In Germany or 
Austria 58 16.4 31.4 82.8 17.2 
In Canada 24 21.3 31.0 62.5 37.5 
Father's birthplace 
not specified 12 20.0 
All voters 1250 21.4 32.0 75.6 24.4 
* Birthplaces of fathers other than those indicated in the table are distributed as follows: 
Russia, 9} Czechoslovakia, 65 Poland, 4j Italy, 3j other countries, 16. 
The ratings of voters with foreign-born fathers (approximately 
four fifths of the voters themselves being native-born) would sug-
gest that "second-generation immigrants" have succeeded about as 
well as other voters in assimilating our political culture. There are 
material differences in a few cases between voters of different na-
tional backgrounds 3 those of British extraction, for example, having 
a substantially higher mean score than any other nationality group; 
higher, too, than the mean score of all voters. No plausible ex-
planation of these differences comes to mind. The accidents of 
selection may be largely responsible. Perhaps in case of the British 
a tradition conducive to the development of exceptional political 
intelligence may have been a factor; and they had, of course, an 
initial linguistic advantage over other voters of foreign extraction, 
except the Canadian group. 
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A comparison may be made of voters coming in vocational 
classes respectively identical with and different from those of their 
fathers. Table 16 indicates the ratings of these two categories on 
both statistical measures. Voters of vocational classes indentical 
with those of their fathers rated lower on both measures than 
voters of classes different from those of their fathers. 
No doubt, differential selectivity is a factor in these differences. 
Voters choosing vocations of different classes from those of their 
fathers are probably characterized on the average by greater initia-
tive and intelligence than those choosing vocations of the same 
classes as their fathers followed. This factor, however, is bound 
up with vocational influences themselves, and its political conse-
quences may be expressed for the most part by way of those influ-
ences. A comparison of the vocational classes of voters and their 
fathers, respectively, will make this clear. 
Table 16.* Mean scores, and percentage distribution of grouped 
scores, by identity and difference in the vocational 
classes of voters and their fathers 
Mean Standard Pet. scores Pet. scores 
score deviation 40 or below 50 or above 
19.2 30.5 80.4 19.6 
23.1 32.5 73.1 26.9 
* Necessarily excluded from comparisons indicated in the table are housewives, and voters 
who came, or whose jathers came, in the heterogeneous group designated as Unclassified. 
See pp. 3-4 for meaning of the term vocational class. 
The voters as a class represented a higher vocational level than 
their fathers occupied, if we may take scores on the true-false test 
as a criterion. By grouping the fathers in the same vocational 
classes as the voters, and giving each such class the same mean 
score as the corresponding class of voters, we should get a hypo-
thetical mean score for all fathers of 15.8, compared with a mean 
for all voters of 21.4. Voters and their fathers are not and cannot 
be made exactly comparable, since no fathers are women, and our 
1250 voters included 297 of that sex. If we make them as compar-
able as possible by excluding Housewives from the voters, and the 
Number 
Class of voters in class 
Vocational classes 9 CO 
same as fathers' ^ 
Vocational classes CCQ 
different from fathers7 
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heterogeneous group designated as Unclassified from both voters 
and fathers, we have resulting adjusted scores of 21.9 for voters, 
and 14.8 for fathers of voters. The rise of the voters as a group 
above the vocational level of their fathers (in the sense above in-
dicated) must, of course, be credited to voters who chose vocations 
of classes different from those of their fathers. Many voters must 
have chosen vocations on a lower level (in the same sense) than 
that of their fathers (the number who did so was not ascertained) ; 
for the greater spread between the adjusted mean scores of all vot-
ers and all fathers, than between voters whose vocational classes 
were respectively identical and non-identical with those of their 
fathers, could not otherwise be explained. 
Table 17 presents the numerical and percentage distribution of 
all voters and their fathers by vocational class. The vocational class-
ifications of voters and fathers are not exactly comparable with 
each other, owing to the inclusion of housewives and, for that mat-
ter, other women in the voters; and also to different percentages 
of voters and fathers in the heterogeneous Unclassified group. The 
figures, however, show roughly the amount and nature of the net 
vocational-class mobility from one generaton to the next, as repre-
sented by this group of voters. Specific occupational mobility within 
the limits of the several vocational classes is not, of course, ex-
pressed in any of the data on class mobility. 
Tabic 17. Distribution of voters and their fathers, by 
vocational class 
Voters Voters' fathers 
Vocational Class Number Per cent Number Per cent 
Farmers 85 6.8 521 41.7 
Manual workers 215 17.2 195 15.6 
Non-manual workers 209 16.7 87 7.0 
Business proprietors 127 10.2 192 15.3 
Professional workers 297 23.7 116 9.3 
Housewives 141 11.3 
Unclassified 176 14.1 139 11.1 
Total 1250 100.0 1250 100.0 
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The relation of f artisan mobility to political intelligence is in-
dicated by the figures of Table 18. As one would expect, voters of 
partisan affiliations different from those of their fathers rate higher 
than those of the same affiliations as their fathers. This, of course, 
is a statistical statement and does not imply that voters different 
from their fathers in this respect are always, or even generally, 
more intelligent politically than voters having the same political 
preferences as their fathers. 
Table 18. Mean scores, and percentage distribution of grouped 
scores, by identity and non-identity in the partisan 
affiliations of voters and their fathers 
Class 
Number 
in class 
Mean 
score 
Standard 
deviation 
Pet, scores 
40 or below 
Pet. scores 
50 or above 
Voters of partisan 
affiliations identical 
with fathers* 843 19.3 31.5 78.2 21.8 
Voters of partisan 
affiliations different 
from fathers' 306 26.5 32.8 69.3 30.7 
All voters * 1250 21.4 32.0 75.6 24.4 
* For various reasons the partisan affiliations of 101 voters could not be compared with 
those of their fathers. See pp. 67-68 for detailed explanation. 
Interpretation here is not difficult. Paternal influence in such 
matters is commonly quite strong, and voters who emancipate 
themselves from it doubtless possess on the average greater ini-
tiative and intelligence than other voters. This, of course, is re-
flected in their intelligence on public questions as well as in their 
departure from the political preferences of their fathers. 
The relations between the partisan affiliations of voters and 
those of their fathers will be analyzed later with reference to sex, 
age, vocational, educational and other differentiations of voters. 
COMPARISON OF INFLUENCES ON POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE 
The associations of "political intelligence" with various influ-
ences on the voter's development have been analyzed. It has been 
possible only in the case of age, schooling, and reading habits, re-
spectively, to measure these relationships. Influences connected 
with vocational interests and partisan preferences, though not sus-
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ceptible of a like quantitative treatment, appear to have been quite 
as significant. Probable factors in political intelligence not treated 
at all in the present study include, among others, those connected 
with pecuniary income, religious belief, and racial heredity. Ob-
viously, too, only general classes of influences could be reached by 
the methods of the investigation. The many diverse influences 
within a specific category—a certain vocation or schooling group, 
for example—could not be treated. These, taken together, may be 
even more significant than the common characteristic that distin-
guishes any such group from others of the same general category. 
Exact comparative analysis of factors associated with scores on 
the true-false test has been limited, of course, to those categories 
that could be treated quantitatively. Three classes of factors have 
been thus analyzed—age, schooling, and number of periodicals 
read regularly. Data for this particular purpose were available for 
only 998 voters. For reasons indicated on page 33, number of daily 
newspapers read by the voter is not included in this phase of the 
analysis.12 
By comparing (1) the multiple and partial correlations with 
(2) the simple correlations between scores and the respective in-
dependent variables, it will be seen that schooling and periodicals 
occupy approximately the same relative positions in the two series ; 
but that age occupies quite different positions. While the simple 
correlation of age and scores indicates a substantial negative associa-
tion of the two variables, the partial and multiple correlations indi-
cate only a slight, if any connection between them. The coefficient 
of partial correlation between scores and age, while of negative 
sign, is less than twice its standard error, and is therefore of doubt-
ful significance. 
Otherwise stated, when the amount of schooling and number of 
1 2 Letting Y be the individual score on the test} Xi, agej X 2 , amount of schooling (in 
years)j and Xs, the number of periodicals read regularly, the average relationship be-
tween scores and the three independent variables taken together is expressed in the equa-
tion: Y = 2.2 — 0.138 X i + 1.61 X 2 + 2 . 2 9 X 3 . 
The standard error of estimate (S y ) by this equation is 29.9 and the coefficient of mul-
tiple correlation (R) is +.330. 
The coefficients of partial (or net) correlation between scores and the three independent 
variables are as follows: for age (r y x i ) , —.057; for schooling (r Y X 2)> + - 1 8 J for periodi-
cals (r y* 3), - f- l$. 
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periodicals read regularly are equalized, or held constant, with 
respect to age, the conditions associated with age appear to have 
little, if any, influence on political intelligence. Moreover, it seems 
possible that the vocational interests of older voters put them at a 
disadvantage in this matter, compared with younger voters. It will 
be recalled that the voters as a whole were on a higher vocational 
level than their fathers, if we take as the basis of comparison a 
criterion based on the mean scores of the various vocational 
classes.13 W e may not unreasonably suppose that older voters com-
pare with young ones somewhat as fathers of voters do with voters 
themselves, there being a like disparity of age. This presumptive 
vocational difference, could its influence be measured, might 
counterbalance or even reverse the slight negative association of 
age and scores indicated by the multiple and partial correlations. 
This would qualify, but not render altogether groundless, what 
was said earlier 1 4 regarding the connections between age and politi-
cal intelligence j for we might still assume that, were conditions 
generally more conducive to competent citizenship, there would be 
a development, with advancing years, of political knowledge and 
insight. 
1 3 Supra} pp. 47-48. 
" Pp. 42-43. 
IV 
I N T E L L I G E N C E O F VOTERS ON S P E C I F I C P U B L I C 
Q U E S T I O N S 
Voters' scores on the several questions covered by the true-
false test may now be analyzed. This will reveal facts about opin-
ions and attitudes not discovered through treatment of scores on 
the test as a whole. The reliability (in the statistical sense) of the 
test on each of the three questions, and on the combination of them 
all, may also be estimated by this means. 
For these purposes five statements under each of the three gen-
eral questions were used, or fifteen statements altogether. Scores 
have been computed, for various classes of voters, on each of these 
statements; and from these, mean scores on the fifteen statements 
as a whole, and on the five statements for each of the three general 
questions, have been computed. By treating group scores on the 
individual statements as the variates in this case, standard errors 
of the means on each of the three general questions, and on the 
combination of them all, may be calculated.1 
From the various mean scores obtained, indexes of "intelli-
gence" on the three general questions may be derived. Different 
sorts of indexes could be calculated from the data. Indexes of the 
intelligence of farmers as regards arbitration of industrial disputes, 
for example, could be obtained by dividing their mean score on the 
five statements under that head ( 1 ) by the mean score of all voters 
1 An illustration may assist in visualizing the procedure. Of the entire 1250 voters, 671 
marked statement 3 correctly, 564 marked it incorrectly, and 15 failed to mark it at all. 
The score (on the basis of 100 as perfect) = ^ 6 7 1 " " " " 5 6 ^ X 1 0 0 z= 8.6. On the other four 
1250 
selected statements under the League of Nations (Nos. 4, 5, 7, and 9 in the test as given) 
the scores of all voters as a class are 49.0, —7.7, 64.6, and 35.8, respectively. The mean 
score on the five League statements is 30.1, and the standard error of this mean (<Jm) is 
11,8. Mean scores and standard errors for statements on the two other general questions, 
and for the statements on all three questions taken together, may be computed in the same 
way; and likewise for specific classes of voters as well as for the entire number. It will 
be seen that the standard errors thus computed are measures of reliability, not of total 
scores obtained by a certain number of voters regarded as a sample, but of statements on 
selected public questions taken as a sample. 
The standard error of the mean (am) and its use as a measure of "reliability" are ex-
plained later (page 56, including footnote). 
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on the same questionj or (2) by the mean score of some arbitrarily 
selected g roup taken as a standard—for instance, voters with seven-
teen years or more of schooling (who ranked higher on all three 
general questions than any other category of voters analyzed in 
this part of t h e study) $ or (3) by the mean score on all three pub-
lic questions of the farmers themselves. In addition, any given 
mean score is itself in the form of an index, being a percentage of 
a theoretically possible perfect score of 100 on the same question. 
Any one of the three methods indicated would yield significant 
results. T h e th i rd is employed here, because it has the merit, when 
indexes of var ious groupings on the three general questions are 
compared, o f indicating influences making for relatively high or 
low ratings, a s the case may be, on these several questions. 
T o i l lustrate the procedure, the indexes of all voters on the 
League of Nations, the tariff, and the compulsory arbitration of 
industrial disputes are obtained by dividing the mean scores on 
these questions (30.1, 31.7, and 14.4, respectively) by the mean 
score on all three questions combined (25.4), which gives indexes 
on these questions of 118, 125, and 57. According to this pro-
cedure, a g roup ' s mean score on the three questions combined (25.4 
in the illustration) is given an index of 100. The standard errors 
of the various means furnish a check on the "reliability" of the 
results. 
T h e possibilities of this procedure are seen when, for example, 
we compare the index of all voters on compulsory arbitration of 
industrial disputes, with indexes of various classes on the same 
question. T h e index of all voters is 575 of manual workers, 87j 
farmers, 4 7 } business proprietors, —73^ professional workers, 68 ; 
Democrats, Republicans and Independents, 58, 44, and 85, re-
spectively. 2 
2 It must be borne in mind throughout that the index of a group (e.g., the business pro-
prietors) on a certain question is computed by dividing its mean score on that question by 
its mean score o n all three questions combined, and multiplying the quotient thus obtained 
by 100. If a group has an exceptionally low index on one question, therefore, it will have 
a correspondingly high index on one or both of the two other general questions. Thus, 
business proprietors have indexes on the League of Nations and the tariff of 191 and 182, 
respectively, compared with indexes for all voters on the same questions, of 118 and 125. 
The sum of a n y group'* indexes on the three questions must equal 300 (though sums of 
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Table 19 presents scores of all voters as a class, and of various 
component groups, on the fifteen statements analyzed in this phase 
of the inquiry. I t will be seen that, as in the case of total scores by 
individual voters, negative scores are recognized and treated as 
such. The justification is virtually the same in the two cases and 
need not be presented again.3 The wide spread from the lowest 
score (—36.2) to the highest score (64.6) of voters as a whole is 
worthy of note. Readers who are interested may gain a notion of 
the relative competency of voters on questions of the sort involved 
by comparing the various statements 4 together with the scores of 
voters thereon. If our group of voters fairly represents the voting 
indexes as recorded in the tables are occasionally 1 more or less than that number, because 
fractions are not given). 
A bit of algebraic exposition should make these relations clear.' Let the small letters, 
a to o, inclusive, stand for the scores of any given group on the fifteen statements used 
in this part of the study: the first five letters for the League statements, the second five 
for the tariff statements, and the third five for the industrial-arbitration statements. The 
mean score on the League will then be. a~r~ D~h^~h d4' e . a n ( j u^e^e w jth mean, scores 
on the other two questions. The sum of the three mean scores will be a~r~k'-f-c . . . -f-Q. 
This will, of course, be three times the mean score on all three question, which will be 
a - f -b - f - c^ . . -f-o ^ otherwise stated, the score on all questions combined is the mean 
(arithmetic average) of the scores on the three questions taken separately. 
Changing the symbols, and letting x, y, and z represent mean scores on League, tariff, 
and arbitration, respectively, and u the mean score on all questions combined, u will equal 
x - f -y -h 2 Then the index on the League, for illustration, will be_x^X 100 > and the sum 
3 u 
of the indexes on all three questions will be f Ì Z Ì £ X 100. Substituting for u in this 
u 
equation its value, xJ^T'^~z y the sum of the three indexes will be / , X 100 , or 300. 3 x-f-y-f-z 
3 
Since, therefore, the three indexes in any given case amount to 300, the lower the index 
on one question, the higher it must be on one or both of the other two questions. 
Necessary explanations of other procedural details may be conveniently given in con-
nection with the systematic presentation of results. 
3 See pp. 11-12. 
4 Statements in tables are numbered the same as in the original true-false test, repro-
duced in Appendix A. 
* The scores of voters as a whole on Statements 1, 2, 23, 27 and 28 of the test (the 
other five statements used, in addition to those listed above, in computing individual scores 
and group averages on the test as a whole) were 20.2, 9.2, 8.7, 49.9, and —39.5, re-
spectively. 
Omitted from the table are various groups too small or indefinite or heterogeneous to 
be of much significance, including Socialists, Unclassified (by vocation), and voters whose 
age, schooling, or politics (as the case may be) was not specified. 
Each series of groups includes, of course, all voters, except for the omissions indicated. 
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population of the country, it is clear, for example, that the opinions 
of voters as a whole on questions of the kind involved in Statements 
5, 28, and 29 are something of a liability from the standpoint of 
public policy; and that these opinions on questions of the sort 
represented by Statements 3 and 30 are not much of an asset. The 
data of Table 19 permit similar comparisons for specific groups of 
voters. 
Table 20 presents mean scores and intelligence indexes of all 
voters on the three general questions. The indexes given in this 
and succeeding tables are to be evaluated, as regards "reliability", 
with reference to the standard errors of the mean scores (<jm)* 
These measures indicate that, in many cases, other true-false tests 
similarly constructed might yield substantially different series of 
mean scores, particularly on the League of Nations and compul-
sory arbitration of industrial disputes, and hence intelligence in-
dexes on the several questions bearing quite different numerical 
relations to one another. The standard errors of the means on all 
questions combined indicate also that voters might have achieved 
total scores on other tests somewhat higher or lower than those 
on this test. These measures of "reliability" have, however, only a 
limited significance, as is shown on pp. 13-14. It is more instructive 
to think of mean scores and intelligence indexes in terms of the 
particular statements serving as tests, without attaching any great 
weight to possible showings on other, hypothetical tests of a similar 
character.5 
5 The standard error of the mean of a sample has a meaning similar to that of THE 
standard deviation of a sample, explained on page 15. Roughly characterized, the standard 
ERROR in a given case signifies a two to one probability that the mean of any other sample 
similarly selected would not differ from the mean of the actual sample by more than THE 
amount OF the error. Thus, the mean score of all voters on the tariff is 31.7 and THE 
standard error of the mean is 3.5 > there are two chances in three, therefore, that their 
mean score on any other similar test would not have been less than 28.2 or more than 35.2. 
This description pertains, however, to the means of considerable samples—samples of 
fifteen or more, according to current statistical assumptions $ whereas in the present phase 
of our study samples of five on each of the three public questions were employed. THE 
distribution of the means of small samples seems not to have been definitively studied, BUT 
recent work on the standard deviation of small samples presumably indicates the probable 
distribution of the means of such samples. W. A. Shewhart obtained experimentally for 
samples of four from a normal universe (the type involved in our study) a probability 
of 90% (as against 99.7% for considerable samples) incidence of all items within THE 
limits described by the mean of a single sample plus and minus three times its standard 
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Very striking is the low index on compulsory arbitration of in-
dustrial disputes, worthy of note also is the small difference be-
tween the indexes on the League of Nations and the tariff, one of 
which is a rather new question, the other a very old one. 
Table 20. Means scores and intelligence indexes of all voters on 
selected public questions 
Mean Standard 
Question score error ( 0 » ) Index 
League of Nations 30.1 11.8 118 
Tariff 31.7 3.5 125 
Arbitration of 
industrial disputes 14.4 13.2 57 
All questions 25.4 6.4 100 
We have no very dependable basis for interpreting these fea-
tures. W e cannot determine, for instance, whether the statements 
on industrial arbitration are intrinsically harder to judge correctly 
than those on the other two questions; there are no available cri-
teria for the measurement and comparison of difficulties in such 
matters. Perhaps a social scientist would not, on inspection, deem 
the statements relative to compulsory arbitration more difficult for 
the ordinary voter to judge correctly than statements on the other 
questions. In any case, indexes on this question are lower for all 
categories of voters, with a single exception, than indexes on either 
of the other two. They also vary more widely from one group to 
another than indexes on the other questions, though, as we should 
expect, indexes on any of these questions are far from uniform for 
different groups of voters. 
Table 21 presents mean scores and intelligence indexes, by sex. 
The only substantial difference between the two sexes lies in the 
higher index of men on the tariff, and the higher index of women 
on the League of Nations, which perhaps indicates differences in 
relative intensities of interest in the two questions. The closer ap-
deviation (symbolically expressed, M'±3CR). See Rider, P. R., The Annals of, Mathematical 
Statistics, II, 52, for reference to Shewhart's paper. 
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Table 21. Mean scores and intelligence indexes on selected public 
questions, by sex 
Class 
All questions League of Nations Tariff Industrial arbitration 
Mean Om Index Mean 0 » Index Mean 0 » Index Mean Gm Index 
Males 24.6 6.3 100 28.7 12.3 117 31.1 3.2 126 14.0 12.5 57 
Females 27.8 7.0 100 34.4 10.2 124 33.3 6.2 120 15.6 15.8 56 
All voters 25.4 6.4 100 30.1 11.8 118 31.7 3.5 125 14.4 13.2 57 
Mean scores and intelligence indexes of various age groups are 
presented in Table 22. The features of particular interest are ( 1 ) 
the steady decrease of indexes on industrial arbitration as one passes 
from the 30-39 to the older groups, though with an upward turn 
in case of the oldest group; and ( 2 ) absorption of the correspond-
ing increase by indexes on the tariff, and practically none by League 
indexes, considering the general t rend. (As explained on pp. 53, 
55, a relatively low index on one question goes with a relatively 
high index on one or both of the other two questions). 
Interpretations must of necessity be hypothetical. The lower 
indexes of the older groups on industrial arbitration might be 
plausibly attributed to less interest or stronger prejudice concern-
ing labor questions, or to both these influences operating together 
(they are no doubt positively correlated in many cases) -y and the 
assumed growth of prejudice with increasing age might, in turn, 
be due to more partisan, propagandists discussion of labor ques-
tions, by the press and other agencies, than of tariff and interna-
tional questions, and the longer exposure of older voters to such 
influences. Judging from the figures, the indexes on the tariff 
merely benefit from the decline in the indexes on arbitration. 
6 It is perhaps unnecessary to explain that had all twenty statements of the test been 
used in this part of the study, mean scores on all questions combined would have been 
identical with mean scores of the same groups when total scores of individual voters were 
treated as the variate. Mean scores based on fifteen statements are higher than mean 
scores on twenty statements (where comparisons are possible) *, being, for example, 25.4 
for all voters compared with 21.4 obtained from the scores of individual voters based on 
twenty statements. 
proximation of men to mean scores and indexes for all voters re-
flects their numerical preponderance over the women. 6 
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Comparison of the mean scores on the three questions indicates 
that the lower mean scores of the older groups on all questions 
combined are due to progressively diminishing competency of vot-
ers, with increasing age, on labor questions implicated in the test, 
and a similar but much less marked diminution of competency on 
the international questions (League of Nations). Mean scores on 
the tariff vary much less, and the older groups compare favorably 
with the younger ones on this question. 
T h e analysis suggests that, notwithstanding the negative corre-
lation of age and scores previously demonstrated (pp. 41-42), older 
voters might be as intelligent on public affairs as younger ones. 
They would seem, however, to be more influenced by biased dis-
cussions, perhaps because in their case the cumulative effect of such 
factors is most pronounced; and to be less competent on the newer 
questions (e.g., the League of Nations), perhaps because interests 
largely crystallized and attitudes already fixed are conducive to 
prejudiced judgments. 
Table 22. Mean scores and intelligence indexes on selected public 
questions, by age 
Age Group 
ALL questions League of Nations Tariff Industrial arbitration 
Mean 0"m Index Mean or» Index Mean CTm Index Mean Index 
21-29 years 28.4 6.7 100 34.4 11.7 121 34.1 3.8 120 16.8 14.8 59 
30-39 " 31.0 57 100 30.8 11.5 99 36.1 3.7 117 26.0 11.6 84 
40-49 " 21.8 6.5 TOO 25.8 12.8 118 26.1 5.5 120 13.6 12.8 62 
50-59 " 20.4 8.1 100 24.8 15.4 122 32.8 2.3 161 3.6 16.0 17 
60-69 " 16.6 7.7 100 20.6 10.7 124 33.1 5.2 200 -4.1 15.6 -25 
70-79 " 22.4 9.6 100 18.4 16.0 82 •47.2 5.4 211 1.6 18.4 7 
All voters * 25.4 6.4 100 30.1 11.8 118 31.7 3.5 125 14.4 13.2 57 
* Includes 152 voters whose ages were not reported. 
Table 23 presents an analysis of intelligence on specific public 
questions in relation to schooling. The groupings represent two 
divisions for the elementary-school period, and one each for high-
school, college, and post-graduate periods. 
The figures seem to indicate but little that is significant respect-
ing selective differentiations of intelligence on the several questions, 
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in relation to schooling. It is worthy of remark, perhaps, that t h e 
0-4 year group had a substantial negative score on industrial arbi -
tration, but higher scores on the League and the tariff than either 
of the two succeeding groups. Of interest, too, is the consistent i n -
crease of scores on arbitration, from the lowest to the highest 
group, especially in view of the fact 7 that there is a slight negative 
Table 23. Mean scores and intelligence indexes on selected public 
questions, by amount of schooling 
Amount of 
schooling 
All questions League of Nations Tariff Industrial arbitration 
Mean 0m Index Mean 0m Index Mean 0 m Index Mean 0 m Index 
0- 4 years 15.2 10.5 100 21.4 15.4 141 33.1 7.5 218 -9 .0 21.4 - 5 9 
5- 8 " 17.5 7.5 100 16.3 14.6 93 27.3 4.6 156 8.8 15.6 50 
9-32 " 17.1 6.2 100 20.1 12.8 118 21.6 2.0 126 9.6 12.8 56 
13-16 » 26.9 7.3 100 34.9 13.3 130 32.9 4.6 122 13.0 15.0 48 
17-21 " 49.8 5.9 100 61.1 7.8 123 52.6 6.4 106 35.8 12.1 72 
All voters * 25,4 6,4 100 30.1 tl.8 
CO
 31.7 3.5 125 14.4 13.2 57 
* Includes 30 voters whose schooling was not specified. 
correlation between total individual scores (covering all three ques-
tions) and amounts of schooling up to and including high-school 
graduation. Finally, the substantially larger index on arbitration 
of those having graduate study compared with all other groups, 
is not without significance, suggesting, as it does, progressive eman-
cipation from biasing influences affecting such questions, when the 
higher levels of schooling are reached, but perhaps reflecting as 
well superior intellectual capacity on the part of that group. 
Mean scores and intelligence indexes by political preference 
are presented in Table 24. Worthy of note are the relatively 
high score and index of Republicans on the League of Nations, 
compared with Democrats ; and their substantially lower scores 
and indexes on the tariff and industrial arbitration. This suggests 
that the higher mean score of Democrats on the three questions 
combined may be credited to partisan "conditioning" influences, 
though in part, perhaps, as suggested in the previous analysis 
of total scores (pp. 39-40), to superior general intelligence repre-
7 See pp. 27-28. 
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Table 24. Mean scores and intelligence indexes on selected public 
questions, by political party 
Party 
All questions League of Nations Tariff Industrial arbitration 
Mean 0 m Index Mean Index Mean am Index Mean Ota Index 
Democrats 30-4 6.1 100 26.2 5.9 86 47.5 5.0 156 17.5 11.7 58 
Republicans 19.9 7.7 100 29.8 16.2 150 21.1 3.0 106 8.7 14.6 44 
Independents 39.8 4.8 100 39.4 8.2 99 46-2 5.4 116 33.8 9.7 85 
All voters * 25,4 6.4 100 30.1 U.8 118 31.7 3.5 125 14.4 13.2 57 
* Includes 15 voters not classified under the groupings of the table. 
senting the outcome of selective influences. In all probability, the 
lower ratings of Republicans on the tariff and industrial arbitra-
tion are due in large measure to a greater divergence of Repub-
lican than of Democratic doctrines from scientific judgments on 
these questions. This difference between Democratic and Re-
publican teachings was accentuated in the State of Kansas as re-
gards industrial arbitration, at the time questionnaires were filled 
out, since the Republican leadership of the State was then spon-
soring a policy of compulsory arbitration not sanctioned by ex-
pert opinion on labor questions. 
Independents have higher mean scores on all three questions 
than Republicans or Democrats, with the exception of the score 
of Democrats on the tariff, which is slightly higher than that 
of the Independents: The index of Independents on industrial 
arbitration is well above that of either Democrats or Republi-
Table 25. Mean scores and intelligence indexes on selected public 
questions, by vocational class 
Class 
AH questions League of Nations Tariff Indust, arbit. 
Mean Ora Index Mean 0*m Index Mean (Tm Index Mean a« Index 
Farmers 12.6 52 100 11.5 9.5 91 20.5 4.2 162 5.9 10.5 47 
Manuals 21.7 7.5 100 17.6 15.4 81 28.5 4.7 132 18.9 15.3 87 
Non-manuals 18.3 7.4 100 25.7 14.8 140 25.5 4.4 139 3.8 13.7 21 
Business props. 12.0 7.8 100 23.0 12.3 191 21.9 4.2 182 -8.8 15.8 -73 
Professionals 43.0 6.2 100 53.9 8.3 125 46.0 5.3 107 29.2 13.7 68 
Housewives 19.7 7.5 100 20.1 14.2 102 27.7 6.7 141 11.3 15.1 57 
All voters * 25.4 6.4 100 30.1 11.8 118 31.7 3.5 125 14.4 13.2 57 
* Includes 176 voters designated as Unclassified. 
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cans, and the sum of their indexes on the tariff and the League 
correspondingly lower. This illustrates a tendency, discussed later, 
for relatively high scores on the three questions combined to be 
associated with relatively high indexes on industrial arbitration, in-
dicating increase in relative competency on this question with in-
crease in general political intelligence. 
Table 25 presents mean scores and indexes of intelligence, by 
vocational class. Very striking is the wide range of the indexes on 
industrial arbitration, also presented graphically in Figure 12. 
These extend from the negative index of —73 for business pro-
prietors to the high positive index of 87 for manual workers, re-
spectively the lowest and the highest index on this question for any 
category of voters analyzed. It is significant, too, that non-manual 
workers (the so-called white-collar class) have a very low index, 
that farmers fall substantially below the index for all voters, and 
that professional workers rise above that index by about the same 
amount. 
The relative positions of farmers and professional workers can 
be interpreted largely in terms of their respective levels of general 
political intelligence, since, as will be shown later, there is a positive 
correlation between mean scores on all questions combined and in-
dexes on industrial arbitration. In the case of business proprietors, 
manual workers and non-manual workers, however, potent influ-
ences are involved that cannot be described in this way. These, as 
the classification itself indicates, are associated with vocational and 
economic status. Membership in the class of business proprietors 
involves influences making for a marked preponderance of incor-
rect over correct judgments on labor questions, while membership 
in the class of manual workers is associated with influences of an 
opposite character, with membership in the class of non-manual 
workers occupying an intermediate position. The very low index 
of non-manual workers may be reasonably attributed to influences 
growing out of their relations with the business class. 
By considering ratios of League and tariff indexes for these 
classes to the indexes for all voters on the same questions, farmers, 
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Fig. 12. Intelligence Indexes of Vocational Classes on Industrial 
Arbitration. 
manual workers and housewives are found to be relatively more 
intelligent on the tariff than on the League; and non-manual work-
ers, business proprietors and professional workers relatively more 
intelligent on the League. Interpretations of likenesses and differ-
ences here would necessarily be in terms of the various influences 
conditioning the interests, attitudes and opinions of the several 
classes. To take a hypothetical example, the greater comparative 
intelligence of business proprietors on the League than on the tariff 
may be due to biasing influences on tariff questions, while the rela-
tively greater intelligence of housewives on the tariff may be due 
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to relatively slight interest in international questions. Such inter-
pretations, in the absence of* relevant data, are necessarily specula-
tive in character. 
Inspection of figures in various tables has suggested the possi-
bility of correlations between ( 1 ) mean scores on all questions com-
bined and (2) indexes on particular questions. This possibility has 
been studied by using the rank method of correlation in an adapted 
form. The mean scores and indexes for all categories of voters 
were consolidated for this purpose, rank orders of means and in-
dexes were determined, and coefficients of correlation were calcu-
lated on this basis. This procedure is, of course, irregular, since 
various classifications of the same facts are treated as if they were 
independent of one another. I t may be justified on the grounds 
that ( 1 ) it would seem not to violate the essential principles under-
lying the rank method of estimating relationships between vari-
ables; and (2) the results are presented only for what they may 
Table 26. Rank orders * of mean scores on all questions, and of 
indexes on specific questions, for various categories of voters 
All questions League 1 Tariff Arbitration 
Category of voters Mean score Rank Index Rank Index Rank Index Rank 
Males 24.6 9 117 14 126 12 57 10 
Females 27.8 7 124 8 120 16 56 12 
21-29 years of age 28.4 6 121 11 120 15 59 7 
30-39 » 31.0 4 99 16 117 18 84 3 
40-49 » » 21.8 11 118 12 120 17 62 6 
50-59 » 20.4 13 122 10 161 6 17 18 
60-69 » 16.6 19 124 7 200 3 —25 20 
70-79 » » 22.4 10 82 21 211 2 7 19 
0- 4 years' schooling 15.2 20 141 3 218 1 —59 21 
5- 8 " » 17.5 17 93 18 156 8 50 13 
9-12 » 17.1 18 118 13 126 13 56 11 
13-16 » » 26.9 8 130 5 122 14 48 14 
17-21 » » 49.8 1 123 9 106 22 72 4 
Democrats 30.4 5 86 20 156 7 58 8 
Republicans 19.9 14 ISO 2 106 21 44 16 
Independents 39.8 3 99 17 116 19 85 2 
Farmers 12.6 21 91 \ 19 162 5 47 15 
Manual workers 21.7 12 81 22 132 11 87 1 
Non-manual workers 18.3 16 140 4 139 10 21 17 
Business proprietors 12.0 22 191 1 182 4 —73 22 
Professional workers 43.0 2 125 6 107 20 68 5 
Housewives 19.7 15 102 15 141 9 57 9 
* Rank orders of groups with the same tabular indexes on specific questions were de-
termined by calculating indexes to the requisite number of decimal places (not shown in 
the table). 
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be worth, that is, merely as indications (to be interpreted in terms 
of the procedure itself) of the correlations under study. The requi-
site data are assembled in Table 26. 8 
Table 27. Correlations between mean scores on all questions and 
indexes on particular questions, for various classifications of voters 
Correlations (p) between mean scores and indexes on 
Basis of classification League of Nations Tariff Industrial arbitration 
Age —.71 —.53 +.71 
Schooling —.20 —.90 +.60 
Vocation —.43 —.94 +.89 
All classes 
consolidated * —.20 —.70 +.72 
* Includes classifications by sex and political party as well as by age, schooling and voca-
tion. See Table 26. 
As a check on this procedure (which is irregular in the sense 
noted a moment ago), correlations between mean scores on all 
questions combined and indexes on particular questions were com-
puted for each classification of voters with a sufficient number of 
groups to permit application of the rank method. The results are 
presented in Table 27, and therewith, for purposes of comparison, 
correlations for all classes of voters consolidated. 
For each classification and for all classifications consolidated, the 
form of the results is the same. There is a marked positive corre-
lation between mean scores and indexes on industrial arbitration; 
a marked negative correlation between mean scores and indexes on 
the tariff; and a less marked negative correlation between mean 
scores and indexes on the League of Nations. 
8 Correlations are computed by Spearman's formula, p = l E^id in which 
N ( N 2 — 1 ) 
is the difference in the corresponding ranks in two related series and N has the usual 
meaning." p (rho) is roughly equivalent to r> or the coefficient of correlation calculated 
according to the more common Pearsonian formula. See Chaddock, R. E., Principles and 
Methods of Statistics (1925), 299 
The coefficients of correlation calculated in the way indicated are as follows: 
For mean scores on all questions combined and indexes on the League of Nations, 
p = — .20. 
For mean scores and indexes on the tariff, p = — .70. 
For mean scores and indexes on compulsory arbitration of industrial disputes, P— -f" «72. 
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This means that with growing political intelligence there is an 
accelerated increase of intelligence on industrial arbitration, but a 
diminishing increase of intelligence on the tariff and League of 
Nations. Expressed differently, as we proceed from the low- to the 
high-score groups, scores on individual arbitration increase faster 
than general scores, and scores on the tariff and League increase 
more slowly. 
Explanations have been offered in previous connections (pp. 
58-62). Labor questions of the sort involved in the true-false test 
are perhaps more difficult, less studied, more affected by bias or 
prejudice, and therefore less easy for the average voter to judge 
correctly than tariff or international questions; and those unfavor-
able influences progressively diminish with increasing education 
and political intelligence. Converse statements would apply to 
questions on the tariff and League of Nations. 
V. 
DATA AND INTERPRETATIONS 
It is a matter of common observation that the partisan prefer-
ences of voters are greatly influenced by those of near relatives, 
particularly parents. Our study sought further light on the subject, 
by procuring data on the voting habits of both voters and their 
fathers, and analyzing them with reference to age, sex, vocational, 
educational, and other differences. The two items of the question-
naire designed to obtain the primary data are as follows: 
"Political party for which the voter votes most frequently," and 
"Party for which father has voted most frequently (if an Amer-
ican citizen)." 
Answers to questions thus framed are presumably inaccurate in 
some instances. Voters not casting their ballots consistently for a 
single party might not always recall correctly the party voted for 
most frequently. I t seems likely, however, that in cases of real 
doubt on this question., the voter would record himself as an Inde-
pendent, rather than as an adherent of one political party. We 
may assume that the answers indicated parties with which the voters 
felt themselves to be identified, except in cases of "independent" 
voting. There is a possible exception. Some adherents of Socialist 
or other radical parties might have hesitated to avow such affilia-
tions, even though all were assured that information on this and 
other questionnaire items would be held confidential. A number 
of voters were unable to give information regarding the political 
preferences of their fathers, and some others, no doubt, because 
of misinformation or faulty memory gave incorrect data. No at-
tempt was made to test the reliability of the evidence on this ques-
tion. The effect of inaccuracies on statistical findings would per-
haps be negligible. 
The political preferences of 101 voters could not be strictly 
compared with those of their fathers. Forty-nine of the fathers 
were not American citizens; 5 were "non-voters", though Ameri-
F A M I L Y I N F L U E N C E S ON POLITICAL PREFERENCES 
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can citizens; the political affiliations of 21 were not specified; the 
affiliation of one voter was not specified; and 25 Independent vot-
ers reported Independent fathers.1 
The proper classification of the Independent voters with Inde-
pendent fathers presented a problem. Independence in politics 
denotes an absence of definite political affiliations and, as a social 
phenomenon, a great variety of political behavior. It did not seem 
correct, therefore, to assume identity of political habit in the case 
of Independent voters with Independent fathers. And it seemed 
quite as incorrect to assume a differentiation of political behavior 
that would classify such voters as unlike their fathers in political 
habits. These voters were, therefore, judged to be unclassifiable 
in this respect. In so far as the political independence of fathers 
may have conditioned a habit of independence on the part of voters 
covered by the study, the procedure followed diminishes slightly 
the percentages of identity in the political preferences of voters and 
their fathers, and correspondingly increases the percentages of dif-
ference. 
Of the 1149 voters comparable with their fathers in this matter, 
843 had identical, and 306 had different, political preferences. The 
percentages are 73.4 and 26.6, respectively. Percentages vary, of 
course, for different categories of voters, though within compara-
tively narrow limits.2 
The significance of these findings may be considered before en-
tering upon the.more detailed analysis. Some more or less arbi-
trary assumptions must be made as a basis for interpretation. W e 
require an assumption as to the number of general political choices 
open to our group of voters. In national politics, four or more 
choices have been available: Republican, Democratic, Socialistic, 
1 The questionnaire did not allow for the fact that, in certain States during certain 
periods, "unnaturalized immigrants" have been admitted to full or limited participation 
in the suffrage. Since citizenship and suffrage are commonly identified, both in law and 
in popular opinion, it seems unlikely that any serious errors have been occasioned by this 
feature of the questionnaire. 
2 No attempt has been made to estimate directly the "reliability" of any such percentages 
as measures of paternal and associated influences on political preferences. This is done to 
some extent, indirectly, in the analysis by groups, since group percentages may be regarded 
as samples of the universe including the given series of groups. Any group percentage 
taken by itself, however, is assumed to furnish only an indication of paternal influences 
affecting that group. This limitation of the analysis should be borne in mind. 
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Independent, and frequently one or more additional choices repre-
sented by minor parties. Let us assume four choices. In State and 
local politics there are usually the Republican, Democratic, and 
Independent choices, and often one or more minor party choices 
also. Let us assume three. At some times and places, of course, one 
of the two major parties does not "run" a full slate of candidates. 
This is frequently the case for local offices, but almost never the 
case for State offices, in the area where most of our voters were con-
centrated. The assumption of three choices would not seem un-
reasonable here, despite the exceptions. We need not, perhaps, 
make any assumption as to whether choices in national—specifically, 
presidential—elections, or in State and local elections, or in both 
classes of elections together, identify for voters themselves their 
major political preferences. It seems likely that national choices 
are usually the criterion; but we can fit the interpretation to each 
of the alternative criteria. 
The comparative merits of the three or four major choices open 
to the voter have a bearing on the interpretation of the findings, 
but there is no way of determining just what that bearing might be. 
The question of comparative merit could not now be decided, since 
informed opinion relative to the question is not homogeneous, being 
itself variously inclined toward the choices open to the ordinary 
voter. W e seem justified, however, in inferring from the ratings 
on the true-false test of political intelligence, that informed judg-
ments on questions involved in competing political choices are not, 
as a rule, the decisive factor in actual choices. 
The relation between political preferences and vocational differ-
entiations should be of interest in this connection, as well as for 
other reasons. Data on this for both voters and their fathers are 
presented in Table 28, which shows the percentage distribution of 
political preferences by vocational class. Only percentages for the 
three major political categories—Republican, Democratic, and In-
dependent—are given. 3 
3 Because minor categories are not given, the sums of the three percentages do not, with 
a single exception, equal a hundred. The difference is greater for -fathers than for voters, 
because a considerable number were not citizens, or their political preferences were not 
specified. 
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The bearing of these data is readily indicated. There is no 
marked differentiation of political preferences by vocational class; 
in other words, the substantial political interests associated with 
vocation or economic class are reflected but little in actual political 
choices. That is t rue of both voters and their fathers. This taken 
in connection with the fact that a large majority (approximately 
70 per cent) * of the voters were of vocational classes different from 
Table 28. Percentage distribution of political preferences by 
vocational class 
Voters Voters' fathers 
Class Rep. Dem. Ind. Rep. Dem. Ind. 
Farmers 65.9 29.4 3.5 55.5 36.1 2.7 
Manual workers 55.3 34.4 8.4 53.3 31.3 4.6 
Non-manual workers 57.9 34.0 7.2 58.6 36.8 2.3 
Business proprietors 60.6 30.7 8.7 56.8 31.3 3.1 
Professional workers 59.3 20.2 18.9 69.8 20.7 2.6 
Housewives 59.6 29.1 9.9 
Unclassified 67.0 22.2 10.2 56.1 30.2 3.6 
All classes 60.1 27.9 10.8 57.0 32.6 3.1 
those of their fathers would argue that vocational interests are not 
themselves much of an influence making for identity in the politi-
cal preferences of voters and their fathers.5 
The assumptions set up as a basis for interpreting percentages 
of identity in the political preferences of voters and their fathers 
are reducible to two: (1) Voters may choose from four major al-
ternatives in national politics, and from three major alternatives in 
State and local politics: (2) these alternatives may not be equally 
meritorious from the standpoint of the voter's genuine political in-
terests; but such interests, including those connected with vocational 
class interests, appear to have but little influence on actual political 
choices. 
4 See Table 17. 
5 The greater percentage of Independents among voters than among fathers is worthy 
of note, particularly in the case of Professionals. There are other substantial differences, 
but explanatory information is not available. 
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A distribution of political preferences in congruity with these 
assumptions would give a measure of identity in the preferences 
of voters and their fathers of 25 or 33 1/3 per cent, which of the 
two it is depending on the assumed primacy of national or of State 
and local politics in identifying for the voter his political classifica-
tion. The actual percentage of identity for our group of voters was 
73.4, this indicating that the affiliations of approximately 40 or 50 
per cent were determined entirely by paternal influence and other 
factors that may be associated therewith. This means, of course, 
that quite irrelevant influences were the decisive determinant of 
political affiliations to that extent. It does not follow that the affili-
ations of all others were determined by relevant influences, since 
paternal example and precept is but one of many irrelevant influ-
ences that condition political choices. 
The interpretation allows for the operation of factors associated 
with paternal influence. No attempt was made to isolate and meas-
ure any such factors. It is highly probable, however, that an im-
portant one is the partisan complexion of the community in which 
voters and their fathers reside. A community that, say, is over-
whelmingly Republican exerts strong pressure on the young voter 
to affiliate with that party, apart from the influence of parental 
example. Where the two major parties are almost equally divided, 
there is little or no pressure of this sort making for identity in the 
partisan affiliations of voters and their fathers. In the area where 
most of our voters were concentrated, both major parties were well 
represented, though it is more Republican than Democratic in com-
plexion. It was and is quite respectable to be a member of either 
party or, because of that fact, to classify oneself as an Independent. 
Hence it is altogether probable that the percentage of identity was 
substantially less than would be found in an area overwhelmingly 
Republican or Democratic, as is the case in many Northern or 
Southern States. 
Then there is the two-party tradition that has dominated Amer-
ican politics from the time party organizations definitely established 
themselves. A great majority of citizens never consider any alter-
native except the Democratic or Republican party (as the case may 
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be), or a species of independence limited to a choice between the 
two. This tradition is undoubtedly responsible for much of the 
difference between actual percentages of identity and the percent-
ages that, according to the assumptions, would obtain in the absence 
of paternal and associated influences. 
Incidentally, we find in this line of reasoning an explanation of 
the political "independence" sometimes claimed for the Middle 
West. A large part of the region was settled by Republicans and 
Democrats in such proportions that no decisive pressure for affilia-
tion with either party was developed, so that the voter could with-
out losing caste vote differently from his father or change from one 
party to another as whim or circumstance might determine. This 
type of independence does not imply any exceptional initiative or 
intelligence in political matters, or in reality much independence 
itself in the eulogistic sense of the term. It is true, of course, that 
in the present study Independents received a substantially higher 
mean score on the true-false test than members of either the Re-
publican or the Democratic party. 
The foregoing general analysis applies, with the necessary adap-
tations, to percentages of identity in the political preferences of vot-
ers and their fathers, for specific groups of voters. Explanations of 
differences in group percentages will, as a rule, parallel the inter-
pretations of differences in mean scores, of the same groups, on the 
Tabic 29. Percentages of identity in the political preferences of 
voters and their fathers, by scores on true-false test 
Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Score of voters of identity Score of voters of identity 
—70 2 100 +30 127 75.6 
—60 8 87.5 +40 110 75.5 
—50 12 83.3 +50 102 70.6 
—40 24 83.3 +60 70 70.0 
—30 35 65.7 +70 50 64.0 
—20 61 73.8 + 80 31 58.1 
—10 92 85.9 +90 19 47.4 
0 136 75.7 + 100 6 66.7 
+ 10 132 69.7 
+ 2 0 132 75.0 All groups 1149 73.4 
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true-false test o£ politicai intelligence. As has been shown,6 voters 
of the same political preferences as those of their fathers had a 
lower mean score on the test than voters with preferences different 
from those of the i r fathers. Table 29 shows, and Figure 13 illus-
trates, percentages of identity for voters grouped according to 
scores on the true-false test.7 
T h e statistical analysis reveals, of course, a fairly high negative 
correlation between scores and percentages of identity. This inverse 
-60 "SO "40 'StO O 20 40 60 00 W 
Mean 5cor*$mX 
Fig. 13. Relation Between Mean Scores on True-False Test and 
Percentages of Identity of Voters' and Their Fathers' 
Political Preferences. 
6 See Table 18 . 
7 The average relation-ship between the two variables (letting Y = percentage of identity, 
and X = score o n the true-false test) is expressed in the equation: Y r= 76.3 —0.136X. The 
standard error ( S y ) is 5.2; and the coefficient of correlation between the two variables 
(r) is —.64 . 
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relation between the two variables will justify resort for explana-
tory purposes to the interpretations of group differences on the 
true-false test. Only as the parallelism between the two series fails 
will independent analysis be necessary.8 
Parallelisms will usually be inexact, especially where voters are 
grouped in a considerable number of classes. Perfect parallelism 
would go only with perfect correlation between mean scores and 
percentages of identity, for the various categories of voters covered 
by the study. 
SEX AND VOCATIONAL DIFFERENCES 
Percentages of identity for the two sexes may be presented in 
non-tabular form. Of 873 males comparable with their fathers as 
regards political preference, 647, or 74.1 per cent, had identical 
preferences; of 276 females comparable with their fathers, 196, or 
7 LO per cent, had identical preferences. This, of course, exempli-
fies the inverse relation between mean scores and percentages of 
identity noted in the preceding paragraphs, since females slightly 
outclass males on the true-false test. Husbands may, however, 
counteract paternal influence on wives to a greater degree than 
wives have a similar influence on husbands. 
Table 30 presents percentages of identity for vocational classes 
and for specific occupational groups with sufficient representatives 
to justify the application of this measure. These specific groups do 
not, of course, cover all the voters in their respective vocational 
classes. 
The inverse relation generally obtaining between mean scores 
and percentages of identity holds, with certain exceptions, for these 
categories. In the case of vocational classes, the order of high to 
low mean scores is the same as the order of low to high percentages 
of identity, except that the relative positions of housewives and 
manual workers are reversed. This may reflect the political influ-
ence of husbands on housewives, which, of course, would counteract 
8 Comparisons of identities in the following tables are not so extensive or detailed as 
were comparisons of scores. The range of variability is rather limited, which makes per-
centages of identity less significant as an index of political competency than mean scores 
or percentages with scores of SO or above. Voters not comparable with their fathers as 
regards political preferences do not figure in any of the tables. 
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to some extent t h e influence of paternal preferences. Of the spe-
cific occupational groups, clerks only have the same relative posi-
tion in the two series j all others, with a single exception, are shifted 
one interval up o r down in the one series, compared with the other 
series. Explanations of these slight shifts must, for the want of 
data, be purely hypothetical and may therefore be omitted. The 
exception mentioned is "non-college" teachers, who had a mean 
score well above the mean of all voters, but whose percentage of 
identity, rather "unexpectedly, was somewhat above the percentage 
for all voters. A hypothesis may be suggested by way of explana-
tion. A great m a n y non-college teachers are unmarried women, 
many of whom a r e fairly young, live in the parental home, or may 
be, owing to psychological factors arising otherwise, exceptionally 
susceptible to paternal influence in partisan matters j while, on the 
other hand, selective influences and intellectual interests connected 
with their profession would make for relatively high intelligence 
on public questions, such as figured in the true-false test. 
With these qualifications, the interpretation of differences in 
vocational class and occupational group percentages would parallel 
in a general way the explanations of differences in mean scores for 
the same categories. 
SCHOOLING AND PATERNAL INFLUENCE 
Table 31 presents percentages of identity by amounts of school-
ing. 9 The relationship between the two variables is graphically rep-
resented in F i g u r e 14. 
Tabic 30. Percentages of identity in the political preferences of 
voters and their fathers, by vocational class and specific occupation 
Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Class i n class of identity Class in class of identity 
Farmers 77 83.1 Professionals 274 68.6 
Manuals 196 72.4 Lawyers 21 71.4 
Barbers 38 73.7 Clergymen 27 59.3 
Carpenters 18 66.7 College teachers 83 60.2 
Non-manuals 198 74.7 Non-college teachers 94 75.5 
Clerks 48 77A Housewives 129 69.0 
Salesmen 55 85.5 Unclassified 163 74.8 
Business props, 112 80.4 
Merchants 76 77.6 All classes 1149 73.4 
9 The average relationship between the two variables (Y = percentage of identity j X = 
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Table 31. Percentages of identity in the political preferences of 
voters and their fathers, by amount of schooling 
Schooling Number Percentage Schooling NUMBER Percentage 
IN years of voters OF IDENTITY IN years OF VOTERS of identity 
0 l 0 12 156 75.6 
2 l 0 13 70 77.1 
3 l 100 14 74 75.7 
4 18 83.3 15 64 73.4 
5 17 82.4 16 94 77.7 
6 39 69.2 17 71 70.4 
7 30 70.0 18 41 75.6 00 206 76.2 19 39 59.0 
9 44 70.5 * 20 or more 35 57.1 
10 73 76.7 Not specified 27 51.9 
11 48 72.9 All groups 1149 73.4 
* Estimated mea», 21 years. 
Comparison of rank orders (not here presented) of mean 
scores and percentages of identity for the various amounts of 
schooling shows that no group occupies the same relative position 
in the two series, the difference ranging from one to ten intervals. 
There is a closer association, however, in the segment of the two 
series between 13 to 20 years or more of schooling, inclusive, than 
in the segment between 0 to 12 years, inclusive. This is connected 
with the fact that there is only a small measure of correlation (and 
that of a negative character) between schooling and mean scores 
for the segment 0 to 12 years, but a substantial positive correlation 
for the other segment. This, together with the positive correlation 
between schooling (as a whole) and scores, and the negative corre-
lation between schooling and percentages of identity, indicates a 
general but inexact parallelism between the order of high to low 
mean scores and the order of low to high percentages of identity. 
T h e explanation of the inexactness may be largely in the relatively 
low correlation between schooling and percentages of identity, 
taken in conjunction with the low (and negative) correlation be-
amount of schooling) is expressed in the equation: Y = 79.9 — 0.50 X. The standard error 
(Sy) is 5.6} and the coefficient of correlation between the two variables (r) is —.34. 
Only a moderate association between the two variables is thus indicated. This, of course, 
reflects the relatively small range of percentages of identity, whatever the basis of classi-
fication. 
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tween amounts of schooling up to twelve years and mean scores 
for voters with those amounts of schooling. 
READING HABITS AND FAMILY INFLUENCES 
Table 32 presents percentages of identity according to number 
of daily newspapers read by the voter,1 0 The statistical analysis 
0 3 6 9 1Z IS IS 21 
Years? Schoolin^^K 
Fig. 14. Relation Between Schooling and Percentages of Identity 
of Voters* and Their Fathers' Political Preferences. 
1 0 The relation between the two variables (Y, percentage of identity\ X, number of 
daily newspapers) is expressed in the equation: Y = 72,9 -\- 0.19X. The standard error (Sy) 
is 3.3 j and the coefficient of correlation (r) between the two variables is + .018 . 
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really indicates, of course, an absence of correlation between the 
two variables, the coefficient of correlation being less than its stand-
ard error. 
Comparison of the rank orders of mean scores and percentages 
of identity, by number of newspapers read, reveals no parallelism 
between the two series. This is what we should expect, since there 
is only a small measure of correlation (positive in sign) between 
mean scores and number of newspapers read. Amount of news-
paper reading, judged by both measures, is correlated but slightly 
with political intelligence.1 1 
The association of magazine reading and political intelligence 
is much closer. The substantial correlation between number of 
magazines read regularly and mean scores on the true-false test 
has been shown. Table 33 presents data on the connection with 
percentages of identity in the political preferences of voters and 
their fathers.1 2 The relationship is graphically represented in Fig-
ure 15, 
Table 32. Percentages of identity in the political preferences of 
voters and their fathers, by number of daily newspapers read 
Number of Number of Percentage Number of Number of Percentage 
newspapers voters of identity newspapers voters of identity 
0 15 86.7 5 20 70.0 
l 212 73.1 6 5 100 
2 553 73.6 7 2 100 
3 290 70.7 Not specified 5 80.0 
4 47 80.9 All groups 1149 73.4 
There is only a rough parallelism between the rank orders of 
high to low mean scores and low to high percentages of identity. 
Three groups of readers have the same relative positions in the two 
series $ three differ by one interval 5 one by two intervals -7 one by 
three intervals j two by four intervals $ and one by six intervals. 
1 1 See pp. 32-33, including footnote 7, for discussion bearing on the reliability of this 
conclusion. 
1 2 The equation of average relationship between the two variables (Y, percentage of 
identity? X, number of magazines read regularly) is: Y = 76.4 — 0.86X. The standard error 
(Sy) is 2.8; and the coefficient of correlation (r) between the two variables is —.62. 
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This is about what we should expect, considering the coefficients of 
correlation between the respective pairs of variables. 
Percentages of identity were computed for only six individual 
magazines. These in order of high to low percentages, with num-
ber of readers in parenthesis, are as follows: Collier's (53), 81.15 
American (282), 77.0; Saturday Evening Post (245), 75.1 ; Liter-
ary Digest (321), 75.1; Harper's (31), 74-2; New Republic (49), 
51.0. Three of the six occupy the same relative positions in rank 
orders arranged as above indicated, and the positions of the three 
others differ by one, two, and three intervals, respectively. 
Table 33. Percentages of identity in the political preferences of 
voters and their fathers, by number of magazines read regularly 
Number of Number of Percentage Number of Number of Percentage 
magazines voters of identity magazines voters of Identity 
0 261 77.4 7 19 68.4 
1 122 73.0 8 11 63.6 
2 194 77.3 9 4 75.0 
3 205 70.7 * 10 or more 21 66.7 
4 113 73.5 Not specified 86 62.8 
5 76 69.7 
6 37 81.1 All groups 1149 73.4 
* Estimated mean is 11.3. 
In view of the parallelism describing the relations between the 
respective pairs of variables, what was said earlier in interpreting 
the connection between magazine reading and scores on the true-
false test will apply, with the necessary qualifications, to the rela-
tion between magazine reading and percentages of identity. As 
was suggested earlier, the data on particular magazines pertain 
only to the political intelligence of their readers, and yield indica-
tions, but not definitive conclusions, as to the nature of the maga-
zines themselves, even as regards their discussions of public ques-
tions. 
PARTISAN AFFILIATIONS AND PATERNAL INFLUENCES 
Data on the connection between partisan affiliations and per-
centages of identity may be presented in non-tabular form. Only 
Republicans, Democrats, and Socialists can be compared in this 
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Number of Periodicals ~X 
Fig. 15. Relation Between Periodicals Read Regularly and 
Percentages of Identity of Voters' and Their 
Fathers' Political Preferences. 
matter, since it has been assumed 1 3 that the Independence of voters 
and the Independence of fathers are not properly classified as iden-
tical in a political sense. 
The percentages of identity, with number of voters indicated 
in parenthesis, are as follows: Republicans (707), 82.7; Democrats 
1 3 See p. 68. 
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(329), 77.5; Socialists (10), 30.0. The number of Socialists is, of 
course, too small to permit of any very significant conclusion.14 
It will be seen by referring to Table 12 that for these three 
parties the order of high to low mean scores on the true-false test 
corresponds exactly with the order of low to high percentages of 
identity. Explanation of differences on the one measure would 
therefore be much the same as that in case of the other, and need 
not be presented again. (See pp. 39-40). 
AGE AND PATERNAL INFLUENCE 
Table 34 presents data on the connection between age and per-
centages of identity. 1 5 
In the rank orders (not here given) of high to low mean 
scores, and low to high percentages of identity, two age groups 
occupy the same relative positions, while the positions of five groups 
differ by one interval each, and those of the five others differ by 
2, 4, 5, 6, and 8 intervals, respectively. This would suggest an 
association of high scores with low percentages, and vice versa, that 
may not actually exist. If so, we should have in this case an ex-
ception to the general rule. For the coefficients of correlation be-
tween age and mean scores, and age and percentages of identity, 
respectively, are of the same sign, being negative in both cases. 
Comparison of coefficients is, of course, more instructive than com-
parison of relative positions in the two rank orders. The apparently 
incompatible results of the two are due to the fact that in the com-
putation of coefficients the age groups are given their proper nu-
merical weights, while this is not done in the arrangement of rank 
orders. 
How explain the apparent anomaly of age having a negative 
correlation with both mean scores and percentages of identity, 
while other factors (schooling, periodicals) susceptible of quanti-
1 4 Ninety-nine Independents and four other voters with political preferences specified 
make up the remainder of the 114-9 voters comparable with their fathers in this matter. 
1 5 The average relationship between the two variables (Y, percentage of identity} X, 
age) is expressed in the equation: Y = 75.6— 0.059X. The standard error (S y ) is 7.9, and 
the coefficient of correlation (r) between the two variables is —.11. The coefficient is 
little more than three times its standard error ( t f r ) , indicating only a moderate association 
of the two variables. 
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tative treatment have correlations with those two variables of op-
posite signs? 1 6 
Table 34. Percentages of identity in the political preferences of 
voters and their fathers, by age 
Number of Percentage Number of Percentage 
Age in years voters of identity Age in years voters of identity 
21-24 116 80.2 55-59 73 83.6 
25-29 178 79.8 60-64 34 88.2 
30-34 114 63.2 65-69 22 63.6 
35-39 119 69.7 70-74 13 84.6 
40-44 149 65.8 75-79 11 45.5 
45-49 97 71.1 Not specified 133 74.4 
50-54 90 73.3 All groups 1149 73.4 
In seeking an answer to this question, one significant possibility 
should be considered. The multiple and partial correlations of age, 
schooling and periodicals with scores on the true-false test indicated 
that when all three of those independent variables figured in the 
measurement of relationships, age variations as such had little or 
no association with variations in scores. This was due to the fact 
that older voters had less schooling or read fewer periodicals than 
younger voters, or suffered from a combination of both disadvan-
tages. If these differences could be similarly allowed for in the 
measurement of relationships between age and percentages of iden-
tity, it would not unlikely be found that the partial was greater 
than the simple correlation of the two variables. 1 7 On this supposi-
tion, older voters would rate even more favorably on percentages 
of identity (compared with younger voters) than the simple nega-
tive correlation of age and percentages would imply. 
We should then have in combination with a virtual absence of 
correlation between age and scores (one measure of political intel-
1 6 The case of newspapers is problematical, for although the two coefficients of correla-
tion are of the same sign, one of them is of negligible numerical value, the other is too 
small to be of much significance, and certain conditions affecting these measurements make 
their validity somewhat questionable. See pp. 32-33. 
1 7 So far as could be ascertained, procedures have not been devised for computing mul-
tiple and partial correlations in cases where the dependent variable consists of group aver-
ages or percentages, and the sum of whose squares, therefore, is not the same for the differ-
ent series of groups defined by the independent variables. 
83] Eldridge: Public Intelligence 83 
ligence) a substantial correlation between age and percentages of 
identity (which also serve as a measure of political intelligence). 
Relatively low percentages, it will be remembered, are taken to in-
dicate relatively high political intelligence, signifying, as they do, a 
relatively high degree of emancipation from paternal and associated 
influences. 
The lower percentages of the older age-groups have a rather 
obvious explanation. The various influences making for differences 
between the political preferences of voters and their fathers are 
cumulative in character. Older voters are, for example, likely to 
be further removed in time and place from paternal and associated 
influences than younger voters. Moreover, they are likely to have 
come under a greater variety of influences tending to disturb politi-
cal habits, such, for instance, as those growing out of residence in 
communities of different partisan complexions. The general effect 
of all these influences must be a gradually increasing divergence 
between the political preferences of voters and their fathers. This, 
of course, merely illustrates once again the operation of the time 
factor in change of every sort. 
The lower percentages of identity in this case should therefore 
not be interpreted as an indication of greater than average political 
intelligence. They represent the cumulative effect, in more than 
average measure, of habit-modifying influences. Specific political 
opinions may change as much as partisan preferences, but our meas-
ures indicate that they do not become more intelligent as voters 
grow older. Our results suggest that an exception must be made, 
in the case of age groups, to the general rule that lower percentages 
of identity indicate higher political intelligence, and vice versa. 
An unequal distribution, proportionately, of older and younger 
voters among the component groups of certain series may be a fac-
tor in the inexact parallelism of the two rank orders employed in 
comparing mean scores and percentage of identity for those series. 
Various statistical findings tend to show, for example, that the 
older age-groups enjoyed less schooling, read fewer periodicals, 
and had a lower vocational status, on the average, than the younger 
groups. Comparative deficiencies in these particulars are generally 
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associated with relatively high percentages of identity, whereas 
older voters have relatively low percentages. Hence, unequal dis-
tribution of influences connected with age may be a factor in the 
inexact parallelism of the two rank orders in some cases. 
SOCIAL MOBILITY AND PERCENTAGES OF IDENTITY 
The various species of social mobility to be considered in con-
nection with percentages of identity have been defined and their 
significance considered in the analysis of scores on the true-false 
test. Reference to that discussion 1 8 will obviate the necessity of 
detailed explanations at this point. 
One species of mobility is denoted when the birthplace and the 
legal residence of the voter fall in different geographic divisions. 
Those mobile in this sense may be further divided into native and 
foreign-born voters. This classification yields three groups: (1) 
the immobile native, (2) the mobile native, and (3) the mobile 
foreign-born. The percentages of identity for these three groups, 
with number of representatives given in parenthesis, are as follows: 
the immobile native (760), 75.1 j the mobile native (376), 70.5; 
the mobile foreign-born (11), 45.5. Two voters were excluded 
from these figures, because their birthplaces were not specified. 
The general rule of low percentages going with high scores 
on the true-false test, and vice versa, is illustrated in case of the 
first two groups, the unmobile native group having a higher per-
centage of identity and lower mean score than the mobile native 
group. The number of foreign-born voters comparable with their 
fathers in this matter is too small to have much significance. Their 
exceptionally low percentage of identity may, however, reflect the 
absence of relevant partisan habits on the part of foreign-born vot-
ers at the time of their settlement in this country. Many such vot-
ers doubtless form their political preferences here about the same 
time their fathers do. Those quite young on arrival would, of 
course, be specially susceptible to paternal influence in this matter. 
Such susceptibility is indicated in the percentage of identity for this 
group (supposing it to have a representative value), since it is 
1 8 Pp. 43 ff. 
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greater than the percentage that might, according to our assump-
tions, be ascribed to other influences. The excess may be mostly 
due, however, to the strength of the two-party tradition. Probably 
foreign-born, like native American, voters rarely consider support 
of any except the Democratic or Republican party, or, instead, a 
sort of oscillating independence confined to a choice between the 
two. It is worthy of note that foreign-born voters outclassed the 
unmobile native-born group on both measures of political intelli-
gence (mean scores and percentages of identity). 
Another species of mobility is denoted by difference between 
the voter's legal residence and his father's birthplace, with geo-
graphic division serving again as the basis of distinction between 
existence and non-existence of mobility. The mobile group in this 
sense may be subdivided into those with native and foreign-born 
fathers, respectively. Percentages of identity, with the numbers of 
the several groups in parenthesis, are as follows: the unmobile 
group (247), 73.7 j the mobile group with native-born fathers 
(720), 75.1 j the mobile group with foreign-born fathers (171), 
64.9. Eleven voters of the whole array (1149 in number) are ex-
cluded from the figures because the birthplaces of their fathers were 
not specified. 
I t will be seen that two-generation mobility has little connec-
tion with paternal influences on political preferences, so far as vot-
ers with native-born fathers are concerned. This harmonizes with 
the corresponding findings relative to mean scores on the true-
false test. Interpretation would be much the same for both meas-
ures of political intelligence.19 
The substantially lower percentage of identity for voters with 
foreign-born fathers 2 0 tends to support the conjectures offered in 
discussing the percentage of identity of foreign-born voters (whose 
fathers also were naturalized citizens). Paternal influence on na-
tive-bom voters with foreign-born fathers (by far the larger por-
tion of voters with foreign-born fathers) is evidently stronger, in 
1 9 See pp. 45-46. 
2 0 Only fathers who became American citizens are involved here. Ct. the questionnaire, 
Appendix A. 
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the matter of political preferences, than on foreign-born voters. 
Otherwise stated, "second-generation immigrants" are more sus-
ceptible to paternal influences, in this matter, than "first-generation 
immigrants." That, of course, is what we should expect, since pa-
ternal precept and example are more common and consistent in 
the one case than in the other. Nevertheless, second-generation 
immigrants are not as much influenced by their fathers, in this mat-
ter, as voters with native-born fathers. 
Vocational mobility is shown by data from the study to have a 
definite connection with paternal influences on political preferences. 
Vocational class rather than specific occupation is employed as the 
basis of distinction between existence and non-existence of mobility 
in this sense. Only 772 voters could be compared with their fathers 
as regards both political preference and vocational class member-
ship. Of these, 227 belonged to the same classes as their fathers ; 
and 545 belonged to classes different from those of their fathers. 
The percentages of identity for the two groups, the unmobile and 
the^mobile, are 78.4 and 72.1, respectively. This is a substantial 
difference, considering the relatively small range of variations in 
such percentages, on any basis of classification. I t may be compared 
with the difference in mean scores of the two groups, which, in the 
order indicated, are 19.2 and 23.1. The general rule describing 
the associations between mean scores and percentages of identity is, 
of course, exemplified in this case. For an interpretation, the dis-
cussion relative to scores may be consulted. 2 1 
It is to be remembered that all the group percentages of identity 
herein presented are susceptible of the interpretation applied to 
voters as a whole (pp. 68-72). According to the assumptions set up 
for interpretative purposes, 25 or 33 1/3 per cent of the political 
preferences of voters (the percentage depending on the assumed 
primacy of national or of State and local politics in defining pref-
erences) would be the same as the preferences of their fathers, in 
the absence of paternal and associated influences, simply as a result 
of the "chance" operation of other influences; and, as a corollary, 
2 i Pp. 47-48. 
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the differences between those and the actual percentages of identity 
may be attributed to paternal and associated influences. Different 
categories of voters may be compared on this basis, and the relative 
effects of those influences estimated. It has not been deemed neces-
sary to make such comparisons for the various classifications of vot-
ers; but the reader may be reminded, in concluding this phase of 
the study, that interpretation and comparison of paternal influences 
on some such basis is essential to the development of their true 
significance. 
VI 
The results of the study need not be recapitulated in detail, but 
some comments on the more instructive findings may be ventured. 
These are offered with a lively appreciation of the fact that the 
voters studied were not a representative sample, but a convenient 
selection of the country's voting population (though many cate-
gories of the selection may be fairly representative) ; and of the 
further fact that the methods and data of the study are open to 
question at many points. Despite these limitations, however, the 
results should furnish some more or less reliable indications con-
cerning the competency of the American electorate, and the various 
influences conditioning their political attitudes and opinions. 
Throughout the discussion, attention has been called to the limita-
tions of both methods and data where these could be identified. 
The most significant thing revealed by the study is the low 
average competency of the voters, judged by our measures of po-
litical intelligence, and the small percentage of competent citizens, 
judged by the special criterion set up for their identification. On a 
true-false test assumed to represent a fair measure of political in-
telligence, a mean score of 21.4 (on the basis of 100 as perfect) was 
obtained by the group of 1250 considered as a whole; 24.4 per cent 
of this group had scores of 50 or above (the assumed index of civic 
competency); while 20.4 per cent received negative scores, indi-
cating that voters had to this extent been conditioned to a larger 
number of erroneous than of valid opinions on public questions. 
Of like significance was the discovery that approximately 40 or 50 
per cent of the entire group had their political preferences de-
termined by paternal and associated influences,1 judged to be, in 
this measure, essentially irrelevant to public questions. 
These findings furnish some indications not only as to the qual-
ity of citizenship in-the strict sense, but also as to the nature of 
public opinion in this country. One's interpretation of the findings 
1 The "associated influences" are discussed on pp. 71-72. 
C O N C L U D I N G C O M M E N T S 
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will, of course, depend on one's beliefs respecting the functions of 
citizens and thei r opinions in political and associated forms of social 
control. T h e evidence will scarcely be reassuring to those who 
favor a wide and intelligent participation of the masses in the con-
trol of public policy. 
Of equal interest, perhaps, is the differentiation of political in-
telligence in association with various conditioning influences. There 
was found t o be little difference between the sexes in this matter, 
although t h e women slightly outclassed the men on all measures 
of political intelligence (perhaps owing to accidents of selection). 
Differentiations associated with vocational differences were found 
to be quite marked, with those engaged in the professions rating 
highest of a l l vocational classes; farmers, non-manual workers and 
business proprietors at the lower end of the scale; and housewives 
and manual workers occupying intermediate positions. Specific oc-
cupations within these general classes were found to be similarly 
differentiated. One's satisfaction with these showings may depend 
on one's vocational class or specific occupation. It will be seen 
that comparative ratings do not in all instances correspond with 
comparative influences on the formation of public policies. Pro-
fessional workers, for example, rate much higher than business 
proprietors, but have much less influence on public policy; and, 
within the professional class itself, lawyers have a much lower rat-
ing but far more influence than clergymen, college teachers, or non-
college (most ly elementary-and secondary-school) teachers. 
The association between schooling and political intelfigence is 
most significant, since we look to the schools, largely, for prepara-
tion of the voter for his civic responsibilities. The statistical analysis 
demonstrated a substantial positive correlation between schooling 
and political intelligence (as indicated by scores on the true-false 
test). But t h e correlation for all amounts of schooling up to and 
including high-school graduation was negative. The association 
between scores and larger amounts of schooling was much closer. 
I t apparently makes little difference, as regards political intelli-
gence, how much or little schooling the voter has unless it extends 
beyond t h e secondary school. We may thus think of high-school 
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graduation as the threshold to the influence of schooling on politi-
cal intelligence. (Those going beyond high school no doubt have 
a higher "native" intelligence, on the average, than other citizens.) 
These conclusions apply, of course, to schooling of the past, in-
cluding the recent past, not necessarily to schooling of the future. 
Reading of daily newspapers was found to be associated little 
if at all with political intelligence as measured by mean scores and 
percentages of identity. The evidence indicated that regular per-
usal of at least one daily paper had a definitely favorable effect, but 
that similar perusal of a greater number was of questionable value. 
But the number of magazines read regularly was shown to be quite 
closely correlated with ratings on both measures of political intelli-
gence. It ranked with schooling, vocational connections, and parti-
san affiliations as a major differentiating factor in this species of 
intelligence. The multiple and partial correlations showed it to be 
second only to schooling among the measurable factors. Selective 
influences are, of course, involved in all such correlations. 
Even more significant, perhaps, are the differences between 
groups reading particular periodicals. These ranged from the mean 
scores (the most significant measure) of 66.0 and 62.0 for New 
Refublic and Nation readers, respectively, to scores of 10.7 and 6.7 
for readers of The Country Gentleman and The Delineator, r e -
spectively. (Groups reading the several periodicals overlap, of 
course, in varying degrees.) If only periodicals featuring the dis-
cussion of public questions had figured in the computation of cor-
relations, they might have proved second to nothing else as a dif-
ferentiating factor in political intelligence. 
Political preferences were also found to be a differentiating fac-
tor of considerable significance. Socialists, Independents, Demo-
crats and Republicans ranked in the order indicated, on both meas-
ures of political intelligence. The analysis suggested that, while 
mean scores may have reflected different degrees of correctness 
characterizing the teachings of the several parties, various selective 
inftaences tend to make the comparative political intelligence of 
party groups in a given area inversely proportionate to their com-
parative numerical strength in the area. Although the data of the 
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study harmonize with this hypothesis, a definitive judgment must 
await further inquiry. 
When other measurable factors were held constant, age was 
found to have virtually no correlation with political intelligence as 
measured by the true-false test. It was found to be negatively cor-
related with percentages of identity in the political preferences of 
voters and their fathers; but this was harmonized with the absence 
of correlation on the other measure by pointing out that there is 
necessarily a cumulative divergence, with increasing age, between 
the political habits of voters and their fathers. The discovery that 
political intelligence does not, generally speaking, increase with ad-
vancing years may be one of the most significant the study has to 
offer. Further investigation is essential to estimate the representa-
tive value of the discovery and to determine, if found to illustrate 
a general rule, whether other species of intelligence have a like 
static character. If political intelligence proved exceptional in this 
respect, the inference would be that institutional arrangements were 
responsible for the deficiency. 
Various sorts of mobility were considered as possible differen-
tiating factors in political intelligence. Of these, spatial mobility 
of the voter (different geographic divisions of birthplace and legal 
residence), occupational mobility (membership of voter in a voca-
tional class different from his father's), and partisan mobility (vot-
er's political preference unlike his father's) were all shown to be 
positively associated with political intelligence; while two-genera-
tion spatial mobility (voter's residence and father's birthplace fall-
ing in different geographic divisions) was found to have virtually 
no connection with this species of intelligence. Both foreign-born 
voters and voters with foreign-born fathers compared quite favor-
ably with other categories on the true-false test (percentages of 
identity as a measure of political intelligence are not fully appli-
cable in their case) ; while one group of "second-generation immi-
grants" (fathers born in England, Scotland, or Wales) received a 
mean score considerably higher than the entire selection of voters. 
The computation, for various groups, of mean scores and "in-
telligence indexes" on each of the three general questions covered 
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by the true-false test yielded significant results in many instances. 
Comparisons showed that group differences on these questions 
taken separately did not, in various instances, parallel the differ-
ences on these questions taken in combination. For example, the 
mean score of Republicans on five League of Nations statements 
was 3.6 higher than that of Democrats, while their mean score on 
15 statements covering all three general questions was 10.5 lower 
than that of Democrats. Again, many groups were found to have 
extraordinarily high or low scores on specific questions. On five 
industrial arbitration statements, manual workers had a mean 
score of 18.9, compared with a mean score of —8.8 for business 
proprietors, and a mean score of 14*4 for all voters. Calculation 
of intelligence indexes on the three general questions facilitated 
identification of such differences, and their interpretation in terms 
of differential group influences. This led to a demonstration—not 
a surprising one, however—that intelligence on one public question 
may develop quite differently from that on other questions. It was 
shown, for example, that in passing from low- to high-score groups, 
intelligence concerning industrial arbitration developed more 
rapidly than intelligence concerning the tariff or League of Na-
tions. This was interpreted as indicating a sort of accelerative 
emancipation from prejudices affecting labor questions, with in-
creasing intelligence on public questions generally. 
The methods of the study are perhaps more significant than its 
specific results. While these are largely based on methods pre-
viously developed, their adaptation to problems of citizenship 
should facilitate^ other studies in that field. Further perfection of 
techniques is, of course, most desirable. A generally acceptable 
method of "measuring" political intelligence would richly repay 
the effort required. Quite as valuable would be concepts and tech-
niques permitting a more refined and comprehensive factorial anal-
ysis of political intelligence. Methods of this "order will become 
crucially significant when problems of citizenship are taken seriously 
and treated in terms of their conditioning factors. This will ob-
viously involve a greater concentration of attention on this field, 
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and its systematic cultivation for the purpose of delevoping more 
competent citizenship. 
It should be added, perhaps, that the present monograph is 
one of a series of studies still in progress. An investigation of 
"practical" developmental problems in this field was reported a 
few years ago in The New Citizenship (1929). The findings of 
the study herein presented will assume increased significance when 
viewed in the light of the previous investigation. 
A P P E N D I X A : T H E Q U E S T I O N N A I R E 
SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES IN POLITICS 
UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS 
Information regarding voters interviewed will be held strictly 
confidential. 
OPINIONS ON SELECTED PUBLIC QUESTIONS 
N O T E : Opinions differ as to the truth or falsity of the following statements. The voter 
is asked to put a -f- (plus) sign before all statements that he considers true, or more true 
than false? a n d a — (minus) sign before all statements that he consider* false, or more 
false than true . All statements should be marked with a plus or minus sign, as the case 
may be. 
T H E LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
„1. We are taking part in many activities 
of the League of Nations without be-
longing- to it, and therefore sharing to 
a great extent in its benefits. 
.2 . Washington's warning against entang-
ling alliances with European nations .7. 
means that we should not now enter 
the League of Nations. 
..3. Entrance into the League of Nations 
— 6 . The League of Nations has already 
proved its ability to settle disputes be-
tween countries that belong to it, and 
to perform other valuable services for 
its members. 
It is our duty to join the League ©f 
Nations because one of our own 
Presidents took the lead in establish-
ing it. 
would be disloyalty to the Constitu- 8. Our entrance into the League of Na-
tions would mean giving up the Mon-
roe Doctrine. 
......9. Differences in race, language and cus-
toms of the various countries of the 
world will make the development of 
an efficient League of Nations dif -
ficult. 
10. The United States has enough to do in 
attending to its own affair*, and 
should not therefore mix in the af-
fairs of European countries. 
tion, since the Constitution gives 
Congress alone the right to declare 
war. 
..4. The distance of the United States 
from Europe does not in itself make 
it possible for us to keep out of Euro-
pean disputes. 
..5. G i v i n g the League of Nations any 
control over our foreign affairs would 
be contrary to the principles of self-
government. 
.11. A h i g h tariff is not necessary to the 
continued prosperity of American in-
dustry. 
..12. A protective tariff increases the cost of 
l i v i n g . 
..13. Tar i f f laws in the past have been 
framed to promote the welfare of the 
farmer and wage-earner equally with 
that of the manufacturer. 
T H E TARIFF 
14. 
..15. 
.16. 
A protective tariff is not necessary to 
the development of new industries in 
the United States. 
England^ prosperity under free trade 
proves that a protective tariff is not 
beneficial to the United States. 
It is impossible for Congress to 
handle tariff questions in a way that 
is just to all concerned. 
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....17. The industrial development of the 
United States .has been due mainly to 
our protective tariff. 
....18. This country has always been more 
prosperous when high tariff rates were 
in force. 
....19. If we had followed a free-trade policy 
in the past, few if any trusts would 
have developed in this country. 
....20. High tariffs are one cause of un-
friendly feeling between countries. 
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION OF INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES 
...-21. The wage-earner has been compelled 
to use the strike to better his condi-
tion, and largely because the state has 
not afforded him needed protection. 
22. Most of the attempts at compulsory 
arbitration in this country have proved 
unsuccessful. 
23. Compulsory arbitration would practi-
cally prevent the peaceful settlement 
of labor disputes by the parties di-
rectly concerned. 
....24. Compulsory arbitration in Australia 
and' New Zealand has not done away 
with serious disputes between employ-
ers and employees in those countries. 
...:25. Practically none of the efforts made 
thus far by- employers and employees 
to settle their differences peaceably 
have proved successful. 
....26. American courts have not on the 
whole been as fair to the wage-earner 
as to the employer. 
....27. The injunction in labor disputes can 
be used more effectively by the em-
ployer than by the employee. 
....28. The continual disputes between capi-
tal and labor show that some sort of 
compulsory arbitration is desirable. 
....29. Labor leaders and agitators are re-
sponsible for most of the trouble be-
tween employers and employees. 
....30. Organized labor's opposition to com-
pulsory arbitration shows that it is 
not concerned in the welfare of the 
public. 
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA CONCERNING VOTER INTERVIEWED 
1. Name of voter 
(omit if requested) 
2. Sex 
3. Year of birth 
(omit if requested) 
4. State of legal residence 
5. State of birth (if born in U.S.) 
6. Country of birth (if not born in U.S.) 
7. Political party for which the voter votes most frequently 
8. Principal occupation for past five years 
9. Check ( V ) below schools of the several kinds attended and the number of years or 
grades completed in each: 
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Kind of School 
Elementary School 
High School 
College (undergraduate) 
Graduate School 
Professional or other school 
for vocational training 
N O T E : If one or more schools attended were not organized according to grades or years, 
estimate the rank of such school or schools, and grade or year completed in each, accord-
ing to prevailing standards of schools so organized; and record such instruction in the 
proper place above. Give the full-time equivalent of any part-time instruction taken by 
the voter, recording this under the proper heading above. 
10. Number of daily newspapers read by the voter 
11. Magazines and periodicals read regularly (give names of below) 
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Number of Grades or Years Completed 
12. Is (or was) father an American citizen? 
13. Party for which father has voted most frequently (if an American citizen) ..... 
14. State in which father was born (if born in U.S.) 
15. Country in which father was born (if not born in U.S.) . 
16. Principal occupation of father 
Name of field worker who interviewed voter 
Date of interview -
APPENDIX B 
M E M B E R S H I P OF VOCATIONAL CLASSES 
The various occupations embraced by the "vocational classes5' 
figuring in the analysis of data regarding voters are specified below, 
together with the numbers engaged in the several occupations. No 
significant subdivisions of farmers and housewives appeared in re-
ported occupations, and a detailed classification of these is therefore 
omitted. The occupations included under "Unclassified" are speci-
fied for the most part in the words of those reporting them. Ex-
amination of the text discussion, pp. 2-5, is quite essential to a cor-
rect understanding of the classification and its component categories. 
Occupation Number 
Air brake repairer 1 
Aluminum molder I 
Auto accessory packer 1 
Bakers 2 
Barbers 39 
Boilermaker 1 
Brakeman 1 
Brick and tile worker 1 
Bricklayers 3 
Bus driver 1 
Cab driver — 1 
Carpenters 21 
Carman 1 
Car repairer 1 
Cattle brander and 
dehorner 1 
Clothing worker 1 
Cooks 2 
Coppersmith 1 
Delivery men 3 
Dressmaker , 1 
Drug- packer 1 
Electricians 6 
MANUAL WORKERS 
Occupation Number 
Elevator operator 1 
Engineers, locomotive 2 
Engineers, stationary .. 3 
Engineer (unspecified) 1 
Engineer and brakeman 1 
Factory workers 4 
Firemen, city 2 
Firemen, locomotive 2 
Fireman, stationary .... 1 
Fireman (unspecified) 1 
Garageman 1 
Houseman 1 
Iron workers 5 
Janitor 1 
Laborers (unspecified) 15 
Letter carriers 10 
Linemen 2 
Linotype operator 1 
Machinists 8 
Mechanics 14 
Meat cutters 2 
Messenger, express 1 
Mill workers 2 
Oiler 1 
Occupation Number 
Orderly 1 
Painters 5 
Pattern maker ... 1 
Pipe fitters 2 
Plasterer 1 
Plumbers 3 
Porters 2 
Railroad switchman — 1 
Railroad yard worker I 
Seamstress —— 1 
Sheet metal workers — 2 
Sign painter 1 
Soap maker 1 
Steamfitters 4 
Steel workers 2 
Stereotyper 1 
Tailor 1 
Teamster 1 
Telephone repairman 1 
Tractor driver 1 
Truck drivers . 6 
Welders 2 
Yardman 1 
NON-MANUAL WORKERS 
Occupation Number Occupation Number Occupation Number 
Accountants . 4 Auditor 1 Bookkeeper and cashier 1 
Advertising men 3 Bookkeepers 7 Bookstore employee .... 1 
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Occupation Number 
Buyers 3 
Cashiers, bank .... 3 
City officials '.. 2 
Clerks 50 
County officials .. 3 
Foremen 12 
Inspectors 2 
Insurance agent . 1 
Managers, superinten-
dents and depart-
ment heads . 15 
Occupation Number 
Matron 1 
Office worker 1 
Pharmacists 5 
Policeman I 
Postmasters 3 
Railroad agents 2 
Railroad conductors .... 2 
Representative of 
packing company .... 1 
Salesmen 57 
Salesmen, traveling ....11 
Occupation Number 
Salesman and clerk .... 1 
Secretaries 3 
Shorthand reporter .... 1 
Solicitor for brokerag-e 1 
Stenographers 2 
Stenographers and 
clerks ~ 3 
Telegraph operators.... 3 
Telephone operator .... 1 
Trainmaster 1 
Typist 1 
BUSINESS PROPRIETORS 
Occupation Number 
Bankers 4 
Boarding house prop. 1 
Broker 1 
Contractors and 
builders 10 
Farm lands, dealer in 1 
Garage proprietor 1 
Lumbermen - 2 
Manufacturers (in-
cluding millers) ...... 4 
Merchants 8 6 
Auto 1 
Coal 3 
Coal and building 
material 1 
Coal and feed 1 
Occupation Number 
Confectionery 1 
Drugs 9 
Dry goods 1 
Furniture 3 
General mdse 5 
Grain „. 2 
Grain and lumber 1 
Occupation Number 
Watchmaker 1 
Class unspecified 34 
Oil contractor 1 
Oyster dealer 1 
Plumbing and heating 
business, prop. 1 
Publishers 2 
Grocery 13 Real estate dealers 
Haberdashery 1 Real estate and oil 
Hardware 1 business, prop. .. 
Ice 2 Thresher 
Jewelry 1 Tailor 
Livestock 2 Transfer business, 
Music store 1 proprietor 
Produce .. 1 Undertakers 
Sand and gravel .. 1 
PROFESSIONAL WORKERS 
Occupation Number 
Abstractors 3 
Agricultural exten-
sion agents 2 
Agricultural extension 
agent and teacher — 1 
Architect 1 
Army officers 4 
Author ... 1 
Chemist — 1 
Chiropodist . 1 
Clergymen 29 
Clergyman and editor 1 
Dentists 4 
Occupation Number 
Draftsman — 1 
Engineers ......... 8 
Journalists 6 
Landscape designer .... 1 
Librarian I 
Lawyers 22 
Physical director 1 
Physicians 8 
Nurses, superintendent 
of 1 
Photographers 2 
Research worker 1 
Social workers 3 
Occupation Number 
Surveyor 1 
Teachers, college and 
university 92 
Teachers, non-college 
(including 3 princi-
pals, and 1 teacher 
and county superin-
tendent) 97 
Teacher and chemist .. 1 
Teacher and clergyman 1 
Technician, laboratory 1 
Veterinarian 1 
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Occupation Number 
Banking —- 5 
Banker and attorney « 1 
Battery concern, 
employee 1 
Builder ~ 1 
Brokerage 1 
Business 2 
Butchers 3 
Carpenter and con-
tractor Ì 
Clerk and seamstress .» 1 
Clothiers 2 
Confectionery 1 
Creamerymen 2 
Dairymen 2 
Dock builder « 1 
Druggist and dairy 
inspector — ~ 1 
Embalmer 1 
Engineer 1 
Farmer and merchant 1 
Farmer and politician 1 
Foreman and merchant 1 
Garage 1 
Hostess, housekeeper 
and politician 1 
Housekeepers and 
clerks 3 
Housekeepers and 
salesmen 2 
Housewife and nurse .. 1 
Housewife and 
music teacher 1 
Housewife and musician 1 
Housewife and 
secretary — 1 
Insurance 4 
UNCLASSIFIED 1 
Occupation Number 
Investments 1 
Merchant and lawyer 1 
Merchant and manager 1 
Milling 1 
Millwright 1 
Mortgage loans 1 
Motor company 
employee 1 
Optometrists . 2 
Painters and 
decorators 3 
Pharmacists 3 
Printers 2 
Railroad men 2 
Railway mail service 1 
Real estate 10 
Real estate and 
insurance 1 
Real estate, loans 
and insurance 1 
Salesman and jeweler 1 
Salesman and musician 1 
Street railway employee 1 
Study (in college or 
university) combined 
with specified occu-
pations 62 
Assistant physicist 1 
Banking . 1 
Business and 
carpentry 1 
Civil engineer 1 
Clerk 4 
Construction work 1 
Contractor 1 
Electrical engineer 1 
Electrician 1 
Occupation Number 
Elevator girl 1 
Farming 2 
Housekeeper 2 
Lawyer 2 
Librarian 1 
Musician 1 
Printer 1 
Power plant 
engineer 1 
Radio operator — 1 
Representative of 
lumber concern 1 
Salesman 3 
Stenographer — 1 
Stenographer and 
secretary 1 
Teacher, college 16 
Teacher, non-
college 16 
Teacher and clerk . 1 
Teacher and housewife 
or housekeeper 7 
Teacher and laborer 1 
Teacher and mechanic 1 
Teacher and pharmacist 1 
Teacher and printer I 
Title examiner 1 
Transfer .— 1 
Traveling student 1 
Traveler 1 
Upholsterers 2 
Veterinarian and milk 
dealer 1 
No occupation 4 
Occupation not 
specified 11 
1 Most but not all of the voters grouped under this head either (1) reported a combination 
of occupations coming within two or more vocational classes, or (2) failed to give sufficient 
information for a definite classification. Those engaged in "banking", for example, did not 
indicate whether they were business proprietors or wage-earners (non-manual workers)} 
while the "housewife and musician" combined occupations coming under different vocational 
classes. Further explanations are given in the text, pp. 3-4. 
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